Published on 5 Dec 2004 by oilcrisis.com. Archived on 5 Mar 2005.
The long road down: decline and the deindustrial future
by John Michael Greer
For more than three decades now, the world has been on notice that the long afternoon of industrial society is drawing to a close. The Club of Rome's epochal report The Limits to Growth (1973), the first of many persuasive studies, warned that unrestricted economic growth would collide with hard planetary limits sometime in the early twenty-first century, unless expensive and politically unpopular steps were taken soon. Of course those steps weren't taken at all. A failure of vision and political will on the part of leaders and constituencies alike threw away the decades that could have made a difference. Today we live in the shadow of that failure.
Yet an odd blindness affects attempts to make sense of our predicament. People on all sides of the debate talk as though the future has only two possible shapes: progress or apocalypse, either business as usual for the foreseeable future or a catastrophic slide into savagery and mass death. Whether the topic is global warming, renewable energy, fossil fuel depletion, or anything else, the same claims repeat like a broken record. One side insists that technology will inevitably solve our problems and yield a better life for all, while the other side brandishes worst case scenarios and talks of millions of corpses. It should be obvious that these aren't the only possibilities. The fact that this isn't obvious at all is worth exploring.
Most people would notice something odd if two meteorologists, discussing tomorrow's weather on a wet autumn day, ignored all possibilities except clear weather or a sudden snowstorm. Yet the same sort of illogic goes unchallenged in debates about our future. Thus it's crucial to set aside our assumptions, and look at what actually happens when civilizations run into the limits of their resource base. That's happened many times in the past, but technological spurts and sudden collapses are rare. Far more common is a process nobody thinks about nowadays: decline.
The Historical Parallels
It's unfashionable to suggest that we have anything to learn from the past. Quite possibly this is because history holds up an unflattering mirror to our follies. Those who recall the 1929 stock market bubble, for example, can find every detail repeated in the tech market frenzy of the late 1990s. The same claims that a "new economy" and new technology made the business cycle obsolete, the same proliferation of investment vehicles (investment trusts then, mutual funds today), the same airy confidence that stock values would go up forever and fundamentals didn't matter: fast forward seventy years, and the follies of 1929 replayed in 1999, cheered on by economists who, of all people, should have known better.
The rise and fall of civilizations offers the same embarrassment on a grander scale. We know beyond the slightest doubt what happens to societies that outrun their resource base: they go under. Clive Ponting's A Green History of the World (1992) documents dozens of past cultures that ended up in history's wrecking yard for exactly this reason. One highly relevant example is the ancient Maya, who flourished on the Yucatan Peninsula of Central America while Europe struggled through the Dark Ages.
Like modern industrial society, the Maya built their civilization on a nonrenewable resource base. In their case it was the fertility of fragile tropical soils, which couldn't support intensive corn farming forever. On that shaky foundation they built an extraordinary civilization with fine art, architecture, astronomy, mathematics, and a calendar more accurate than the one we use today. None of that counted when the crops began to fail. Mayan civilization disintegrated, cities were abandoned to the jungle, and the population of the Mayan heartland dropped by 90%.
The parallels go deeper, for the Maya had other options. They could have switched from corn to more sustainable crops such as ramon nuts, or borrowed intensive wetland farming methods from their neighbors to the north. Neither of these happened, because corn farming was central to Maya political ideology. The power of the ahauob or "divine lords" who ruled Maya city-states depended on control of the corn crop, so switching crops or farming systems was unthinkable. Instead, Maya elites responded to crisis by launching wars to seize fields and corn from other city-states, making their decline and fall far more brutal than it had to be.
Even so, the Maya decline wasn't a fast process. Maya cities weren't abandoned overnight, as archeologists of two generations ago mistakenly thought, but went under in a "rolling collapse" spread across a century and a half from 750 to 900. Outside the Maya heartland, the process took even longer. Chichen Itza far to the north still flourished long after cities such as Tikal and Bonampak were overgrown ruins, and Mayan city-states on a small scale survived in corners of the Yucatan right up to the Spanish conquest.
Map the Maya collapse onto human lifespans and the real scale of the process comes through. A Maya woman born around 730 would have seen the crisis dawn, but the ahauob and their cities still flourished when she died of old age seventy years later. Her great-grandson, born around 800, grew up amid a disintegrating society, and the wars and crop failures of his time would have seemed ordinary to him. His great-granddaughter, born around 870, never knew anything but ruins sinking back into the jungle. When she and her family finally set out for a distant village, the last to leave their empty city, it would never have occurred to her that her quiet footsteps on a dirt path marked the end of a civilization.
The Olduvai Theory
This same pattern repeats over and over again in history. Gradual disintegration, not sudden catastrophic collapse, is the way civilizations end. It usually takes somewhere between 150 and 350 years for a civilization to decline and fall. This casts a startling light on today's crisis. It took America two centuries of incremental change to transform itself from an agrarian society to its current status as an aging industrial behemoth. Now, with its resource base failing, it faces the common fate of civilizations. Yet if that fate follows its usual timeline, it could easily take two more centuries of incremental change to transform America to an agrarian society again.
Startling as this seems, it's supported by telling evidence. Consider our dwindling oil resources. The Hubbert Curve, devised by geologist M. King Hubbert in the 1950s, tracks production over time for any oil reserve from a single oil well to a planet. It's a bell shaped curve: oil comes slowly at first, rises to peak production, then falls gradually to zero. The peak arrives when roughly half the oil is gone. The continental US reached peak in 1970, and production has slumped ever since. Many energy scientists put the worldwide peak before 2010. After the peak, according to the Hubbert Curve, global oil production will decline at about the same rate it rose before. With a peak before 2010, production in 2030 will be somewhere around production in 1975 or 1980, or maybe 20 billion barrels. 2030's oil will have to meet the needs of a doubled world population and a world in crisis, but 20 billion barrels is still a lot of oil.
To misquote T.S. Eliot, this is the way the oil ends, not with a bang but a trickle. Other fossil fuels are headed the same way, along with uranium for nuclear power, but they can help cushion declining oil production for a while before they hit their own Hubbert peaks. Renewable energy sources can provide only a small fraction of the energy we now get from fossil fuels, but that fraction can help cushion the decline and stretch dwindling oil and coal reserves. The problem we face isn't having no energy at all. It's having to make do with less and less each year, until finally we get down to levels that can be sustained indefinitely.
The logic of the Hubbert Curve provides the framework for Richard Duncan's Olduvai Theory , an uncompromising look at a deindustrial future. Duncan starts with White's Law, a widely accepted rule that culture evolves as the amount of energy per capita goes up. Globally, energy per capita stood at very modest levels until 1800, when fossil fuels sent it skyrocketing to its all-time peak in 1979. At that point, Duncan shows, two centuries of explosive progress began to unravel.
After 1979, global energy per capita declined as rising population outstripped modest increases in energy production. As energy production itself drops after the Hubbert Curve peaks, the decline accelerates. Follow the curve, and by 2030 global energy per capita is where it was in 1930, around a third of its 1979 value. Duncan argues that the industrial age is a pulse waveform, a single, bell-shaped, nonrepeating curve centered on 1979. Since no renewable energy resource can provide more than a small fraction of the immense amounts of fossil fuel energy we've squandered in the recent past, he predicts that the millennia of low tech cultures before the industrial pulse, when nobody knew about the fantastic treasure of free energy locked up in fossil fuels, will be balanced by millennia of low tech cultures after the industrial pulse, when the treasure will be gone forever.
The Power of Myth
Many people find predictions of this sort extremely upsetting. Believers in progress insist that human ingenuity will get progress going again somehow and lead to a more advanced society than we have today. Believers in apocalypse insist that incremental declines will bring about catastrophe somehow and lead to mass death and a Road Warrior future. The concept of a slow descent to the agrarian cultures of the deindustrial future offends both. In my experience, many believers in either one literally can't fit their minds around a third alternative.
Blind spots of this sort shows the hidden presence of myth. Many people nowadays think only primitive people believe in myths, but myths dominate the thinking of every society, including our own. A myth is a story that makes sense of the world. Most ancient cultures took their myths from religion; most modern societies take theirs from science or political ideology. Two competing stories provide modern society with its most popular myths. You know them both.
The first is called the progressivist myth. According to this story, all of human history is a drama of progress. From primitive ignorance and savagery, according to the progressivist myth, people climbed step by step up the ladder of civilization. Knowledge gathered over generations made it possible for each culture to go further than the ones before it. With modern times, progress went into overdrive, and it's still in overdrive today. The purpose of human existence is to make this upward climb possible so that our descendants can someday reach the stars.
The second is called the separativist myth. According to this story, all of human history is a tragic blind alley. Once people lived in harmony with their world, each other, and themselves, but that time ended and things have gone downhill ever since. Vast cities governed by bloated bureaucracies, inhabited by people who have abandoned spiritual values for a wholly material existence, mark the point of no return. Sometime soon the whole rickety structure will come crashing down, overwhelmed by sudden crisis, and countless people will die. Only those who abandon a corrupt and doomed society will survive to build a better world.
Both stories are versions of the much older religious myth of apocalypse, which includes vast disasters followed by a millennium of bliss for the chosen. Sociologist Philip Lamy showed in his book Millennial Rage (1996) that most people, including most Christians, now embrace "fractured" versions of the apocalypse myth which focus on one theme out of the complexity of the older myth. The progressivist and separativist myths are good examples, the former stressing the hope of future bliss, the latter the threat of catastrophe.
The mythic nature of these viewpoints shows up clearly when either one is measured against history. Believers in progress insist that human history has always been progressive, but a look at the past challenges this comfortable faith to its core. Between the agricultural revolution and the industrial age, human life changed little; all things considered, the life of an peasant in Egypt under the Pharaohs was not much different from that of a peasant in seventeenth-century France (both even had a Sun King). Industrialization broke the pattern only by tapping into stored energy in the earth to launch two centuries of exuberant growth.
Everything necessary for industrial society, except a way to turn fossil fuels into mechanical energy, existed long before the industrial revolution. Renewable energy sources? Wind power, water power, and biomass were all used extensively in the preindustrial past. Scientific knowledge? The laws of mechanics were worked out in ancient times, and a Greek scientist even invented the steam turbine before the birth of Christ; without fossil fuels it was a useless curiosity. Human resourcefulness and ingenuity? People in past ages were as resourceful and ingenious as we are. Fossil fuels make the one crucial difference between ancient cultures and modern industrial society. As fossil fuels run out and the ecological consequences of their misues come home to roost, that difference will go away. As for those who simply insist that "we can't go back," that's easy to say, but we no longer have the resources to go forward, and soon we won't even be able to stand still. What other direction do they have in mind?
Believers in apocalypse, for their part, insist that our civilization's end will be sudden, catastrophic, and total. As shown earlier in this essay, history doesn't support that claim. Civilizations take time to fall, the resource base of industrial society is shrinking but it's far from exhausted, the impact of global warming and other ecological disruptions build slowly over time, and ruling elites and ordinary citizens alike have every reason to hold things together as long as possible. The history of the last century shows that industrial societies can endure tremendous disruption without dissolving into a Hobbesian war of all against all, and people in hard times are far more likely to follow orders and hope for the best than to join the rampaging mobs that play so large a role in survivalist fantasies. The sorry history of the Y2K noncrisis a few years ago may also make a good reminder that risks of catastrophe can be overrated.
Of course it's possible that some ultra-catastrophe is waiting to wipe us all out, just as it's possible that scientists might pull a technological rabbit out of a hat and give industrial society a new lease on life. It's also possible that aliens from space might go zipping through our atmosphere in flying teacups next Tuesday, dropping radioactive vegetables on everyone named Fred. The fact that this last possibility can't be ruled out doesn't make it reasonable to gamble our future on being able to power factories with glow-in-the-dark cabbages!
It's reasonable to consider catastrophe and continued progress as possibilities, but both have to be weighed against the realities of our present situation and the evidence of history. Both require a deus ex machina on a grand scale to change the course of events: ordinary catastrophes aren't enough to bring industrial society down overnight, just as ordinary technological progress isn't enough to get industrial society out of the mess it's made for itself. Without an extraordinary event, our civilization is headed down the well-trodden path of decline. If there's a point in planning for the future at all, it makes sense to plan for the one we're most likely to get.
Both the progressivist myth and the separativist myth have poweful emotional appeal; that's why they're popular. The myth of perpetual progress comforts those people who have made their peace with society as it is, and who want to believe that their lives are part of a process which leads eventually to better things. The myth of imminent apocalypse comforts those people who cannot accept society as it is, and want to believe in a catastrophe that topples the proud towers of a civilization they loathe. Still, the fact that a belief is emotionally powerful and comforting doesn't make it true.
The Course of Decline
To see past mythology to the hard realities of the future takes a clear sense of our predicament. More than six billion people live on a planet that can support one billion indefinitely. We can't meet everyone's needs now, and the resources to maintain even today's standards of living are running short. Resource wars have already begun - the 2003 US invasion of Iraq may someday be recalled as the first of the Oil Wars. Meanwhile global warming boosts the cost of natural disasters so fast that one of the world's largest reinsurance firms, Swiss RE, warns that this all by itself will bankrupt the world economy before 2060.
Leave out the deus ex machina of progressive and apocalyptic mythologies, map the results onto a scale of human lifespans, and a likely future emerges. Imagine an American woman born in 1960. She sees the gas lines of the 1970s, the short-term political gimmicks that papered over the crisis in the 1980s and 1990s, and renewed trouble in the following decades. Soaring energy prices, shortages, economic depressions, and resource wars shape the rest of her life. By age 70, she lives in a beleaguered, malfunctioning city where half the population has no reliable access to clean water, electricity, or health care. Shantytowns spread in the shadow of skyscrapers while political and economic leaders keep insisting that things are getting better.
Her great-grandson, born in 2030, manages to avoid the smorgasbord of diseases, the pervasive violence, and the pandemic alcohol and drug abuse that claim half of his generation before age 30. A lucky break gets him into a technical career, safe from military service in endless wars overseas or "pacification actions" against separatist guerrillas at home. His technical knowledge consists mostly of rules of thumb for effective scavenging, cars and refrigerators are luxury items he will never own, his home lacks electricity and central heating, and his health care comes from an old woman whose grandmother was a doctor and who knows something about wound care and herbs. By the time his hair turns gray the squabbling regions that were once the United States have split apart, all remaining fuel and electrical power have been commandeered by the new governments, and coastal cities are being abandoned to the rising oceans.
For his great-granddaughter, born in 2100, the great crises are mostly things of the past. She grows up amid a ring of sparsely populated villages surrounding an abandoned core of rusting skyscrapers visited only by salvage crews who mine them for raw materials. Local wars sputter, the oceans are still rising, and famines and epidemics are a familiar reality, but with global population maybe 15% of what it was in 2000, humanity and nature are moving toward balance. She learns to read and write, a skill most of her neighbors don't have, and a few old books are among her prized possessions, but the days when men walked on the moon are fading into legend. When she and her family finally set out for a village in the countryside, leaving the husk of the old city to the salvage crews, it never occurs to her that her quiet footsteps on a crumbling asphalt road mark the end of a civilization.
What Can Be Done
People try to sense the shape of the future for much the same reason that drivers watch the road ahead: it's easier to manage crises and take advantage of opportunities if you have enough time to react. So far the two myths already discussed have dominated planning for the future. Believers in progress hold that the best way to face the future is to pour money into research and development, so that new technologies to drive progress will be ready in time. Believers in apocalypse hold that the best way to face the future is to build isolated enclaves stocked with food and weaponry, where those who plan on surviving doomsday can hole up and wait it out.
If we face an age of decline, though, neither of these approaches is worth much. Research and development might be useful if focused on simple, sustainable technologies, but projects of this sort need to be done soon: as decline gets under way, funding for scientific research will be one of the first things cut. As for holing up in a mountain cabin, the slow pace of decline makes this utterly irrelevant. No matter how much canned food and ammo you have, it's not going to last a couple of centuries, and neither are you.
A different future requires a different kind of thinking. The crucial needs that must be met in an age of decline are damage control, cultural survival, and the building of a new society amid the ruins of the old. Political and business interests aren't going to meet these needs, or do anything else helpful; oil is to the modern industrial nations what corn was to the ancient Maya, and the ahauob of Washington and Wall Street have turned to war just as their Maya equivalents did. Fortunately, all three needs can be met by individuals and small groups with limited resources, and projects of this kind are being done on a small scale already.
Damage control focuses on ways to keep the impact of decline from costing more than it has to. The great challenge here is that most people in the developed world have no idea how to survive outside the cocoon of industrial society. As technology unravels, infrastructure breaks down, and local disasters hit, people will have to provide what they need for survival by their own efforts, from locally available materials, and yet most people nowadays can't even light a fire to stay warm without matches or a lighter. People will have to learn survival, first aid, and skills of self-reliant living to meet this challenge. Groups can build on this by forming support networks and working out overlapping specialties, so people can draw on a wider range of skills.
The temptation to rely on stockpiles of food, technology, weapons, or precious metals to get through the impact of an age of decline is natural, but fatal. For two centuries machines and their products have been cheaper than skilled human beings. The result is a habit of valuing things over skills and, ultimately, a "prosthetic society" in which we're taught to neglect abilities and then pay for technological replacements: we use day planners instead of training our memories, buy bread machines instead of learning to bake, watch television instead of using our imaginations. That has to be unlearned in a hurry. In hard times, if you have a stockpile, you're a sitting target for other people interested in removing you from your stockpile and enjoying it themselves - but if you have valuable skills you can share and teach, everyone's your friend.
These same principles govern strategies to meet the other two needs. Cultural survival focuses on hanging onto the heritage of the last few thousand years. That's a tall order, because nearly all of it is brutally vulnerable to an age of decline. Nearly all books printed in the last century and a half are on high-acid paper, which gradually turns back to sawdust; librarians are already struggling to preserve collections of disintegrating nineteenth-century books. CDs and DVDs, like other electronic media, have much shorter lifespans, and won't be playable anyway in a low tech future. When people are struggling to survive, literature, music, art, and science aren't usually very high on their list of priorities anyway.
Any effort toward cultural survival, in other words, will have to involve ruthless sorting. Today's sprawling libraries will need careful winnowing to sort out collections small enough to be copied by hand if it comes to that. Musical forms that can be passed on as living traditions will be more likely to make it, which means folk music has a better chance than Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. A huge amount will inevitably be lost; the job at hand is to try to make sure that the best possible selection gets through.
One thing that's sometimes been suggested by scientists, a book packed with everything science has discovered so far, is more problematic. History shows that the scientific treatises of one age become the fossilized dogmas of the next, and people in a deindustrial society, given a book with all the answers, could too easily end up thinking that the way to answer any question was to look it up in an old book. That way lies stagnation. Far better would be a textbook on scientific method, treatises on a few useful sciences such as ecology and mechanics, and enough hints and fragments to tantalize future thinkers into launching investigations of their own.
The work of building a new society, finally, will be much easier if the process starts now. During the last two centuries, the quickest way to prosper was to ride the wave of progress, using more energy, more resources, and more technology than your competitors. For the next two centuries, the quickest way to prosper will likely stand this rule on its head. Those who accept the reality of decline and get by on less energy, less resources, and less technology than their competitors will win out. The irony is that now, before the immense knowledge base of industrial society begins to come apart, is the best time to look for ways of living that use less of what we won't have soon.
Organic farming is an excellent case in point. In the last century organic agriculture has made immense strides, to the point that it's now possible to grow a spare but adequate diet year round for one person on less than 1000 square feet of soil, with only hand labor and no fossil fuel inputs at all, and do it while increasing the long term fertility of the soil. These methods may turn out to be our civilization's greatest gift to the future, provided they survive the approaching age of decline. Today they're covered in detail in dozens of books; whether that will be true in a hundred years depends on what we do right now.
Monday, May 08, 2006
FIVE FUNDAMENTAL ERRORS
The Long Version, by Jay Hanson -- http://www.dieoff.org/
(Permission to reprint explicitly granted.)
Modern economics is nothing more than "Social Darwinism" (the politics -- NOT the science) as first revealed by God to the Dominican Friar St. Thomas Aquinas 750 years ago, and then perfected by the Physiocrats 230 years ago. Unfortunately, God didn't bother to reveal the Laws of Thermodynamics to St. Thomas at the same time as he was doing "free markets". But then it's not too surprising considering the fact that God also neglected to mention that the Earth orbited the Sun.
Any ONE fundamental error in Neoclassical theory should be sufficient reason to reject conclusions based upon that theory. Here are five fundamental errors in the theory:
#1. A fundamentally incorrect "method": the economist uses "correlation" and "post hoc, ergo propter hoc" (after-the-fact) reasoning, rather than the "scientific method" and biological theories of behavior:
"Economists enamored of pure markets begin with the theory, and hang models on assumptions that cannot themselves be challenged. The characteristic grammatical usage is an unusual subjunctive -- the verb form 'must be.' For example, if wages for manual workers are declining, it must be that their economic value is declining. If a corporate raider walks away from a deal with half a billion dollars, it must be that he added that much value to the economy. If Japan can produce better autos than Detroit, there must be some inherent locational logic, else the market would not dictate that result. If commercial advertising leads consumers to buy shoddy or harmful products, they must be 'maximizing their utility' -- because we know by assumption that consumers always maximize their utility. How do we know that? Because to do anything else would be irrational. And how do we know that individuals always behave rationally? Because that is the premise from which we begin. The truly interesting institutional questions -- the disjunctures between what free-market assumptions would predict and the actual outcomes -- are dismissed by the tautological and deductive form of reasoning. The fact that the real world is already far from a perfect market is ignored for the sake of theoretic convenience. The dissenter cannot challenge the theory; he can only describe the real world." [p. 9]
"There is at the core of the celebration of markets a relentless tautology. If we begin, by assumption, with the premise that nearly everything can be understood as a market and that markets optimize outcomes, then everything else leads back to the same conclusion -- marketize! If, in the event, a particular market doesn't optimize, there is only one possible inference: it must be insufficiently marketlike. This epistemological sleight of hand is an astonishing blend that blurs the descriptive with the normative. It is a no-fail system for guaranteeing that theory trumps evidence. Should some human activity not, in fact, behave like an efficient market, it must be the result of some interference that should be removed or a stubborn human refusal to appreciate markets. It cannot possibly be that the theory fails to specify accurately how human behavior works." [p. 6, EVERYTHING FOR SALE, Robert Kuttner; Knopf, 1997; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0394583922 ]
"It was not the methods of science that were appropriated by the early neoclassicals as it was the appearances of science, for the early neoclassicals possessed a singularly inept understanding of the physics they so admired… [ Neoclassical economists attempt ] to reduce all social institutions such as money, property rights, and the market itself to epiphenomena of individual constrained optimization calculation. All these attempts have failed, despite their supposed dependence upon mathematical rigor, because they always inadvertently assume what they aim to deduce… Conservation principles are the key to the understanding of a mathematical formulation of any phenomenon, and it has been there that the neoclassicals have been woefully negligent." [ p. 6, AGAINST MECHANISM: Protecting Economics from Science, by Philip Mirowski; Rowman and Littlefield, 1988; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0847676951 ]
"My analysis showed that the neoclassical theorist of economic behavior is confronted with the dilemma of restricting his or her analysis to a case-by-case taxonomy of individual agent choice, given the inaccessibility to mental states, or grounding his or her explanatory theories on the normative heuristic of rational choice. Neither alternative yields scientific results." [p. 151, SCIENCE, RATIONALITY, AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS, L.D. Keita; Delaware, 1992; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0874134102 ]
SCIENTIFIC METHOD
The "scientific method" is the ONLY way yet discovered for discovering truth amid a world of lies and delusion. The simple version looks something like this:
a. Observe some aspect of the universe.
b. Invent a theory that is consistent with what you have observed.
c. Use the theory to make predictions.
d. Test those predictions by experiments or further observations.
e. Modify the theory in the light of your results.
Go to step c. [ http://www.xnet.com/~blatura/skep_1.html]
ECONOMIST METHOD (by analogy)
Did I ever tell you about my cat? I have a cat that can predict the stock market!!!!!
I got this cat about ten years ago from an old lady who said that it could predict the stock market. She said that if the cat "meowed", the stock market would go up on that day. I didn't believe it at first, but sure-enough it was true. Over the last nine years the cat was right more than it was wrong -- I made millions.
About a year ago, a car killed my cat. I really loved that cat so I had it stuffed and put on the wall. You know what? The cat doesn't meow anymore, but the stock market doesn't go up anymore either. So I am beginning to think that the cat actually CAUSED the stock market to go up or down. Numbers don't lie do they?
Now I am not sure whether the meow was cause or effect... I am sure I can find out which by studying economics. (Although some say there are virtually an infinite number of explanations for the same observation, and only the "scientific method" can separate fact from fiction.)
What do you think? Was the meow cause or effect? Or both? Or neither? Economists run into this problem all the time...
#2. A fundamentally inverted world view: the economist sees the environment as a subsystem of the economy, rather than the other way around. In other words, economists are trained to believe that natural resources come from "markets" rather than the "environment". The historical analogy is Johann Kepler and Tycho Brahe watching the dawn together. Kepler sees the sun come into view as the earth turns; Brahe sees the sun begin its daily journey around a static earth.
The corollary is that economists believe that "man-made capital" can substitute for "natural capital". Nobel Laureate Robert Solow:"... the world can, in effect, get along without natural resources ... at some finite cost, production can be freed of dependence on exhaustible resources altogether... [ 1974 lecture to the American Economic Association cited in p. 117, STEADY-STATE ECONOMICS, Herman E. Daly; Island Press, 1991; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/155963071X ]
But the First Law of thermodynamics tells us there is no "creation" -- there is no such thing as "man-made capital". Thus, ALL capital is "natural capital", and the economy is 100% dependent on the "environment" for everything.
#3. A fundamentally incorrect view of "money": the economist sees "money" as nothing more than a medium of exchange, rather than as social power -- or "political power":
"MONEY: Anything which is widely acceptable in exchange for goods, or in settling debts, not for itself but because it can be similarly passed on, has the character of money since it serves the primary function of money, i.e. a means of payment. As a means of payment money is an entity which is transferred when a payment is made; as such it acts as a MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE, a function essential to any economy other than the most primitive." [ p. 285, THE MIT DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, Fourth Edition; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262660784/brainfood.a ].
But even the casual observer can see that money is social power because it "empowers" people to buy and do the things they want -- including buying and doing other people: politics.
If employers have the freedom to pay workers less "political power", then they will retain more political power for themselves. Money is, in a word, "coercion", and "economic efficiency" is correctly seen as a political concept designed to conserve social power for those who have it -- to make the politically powerful, even more powerful, and the politically weak, even weaker.
For a surrealistic glimpse into the utterly insane world of a typical economist, see http://minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr140.pdf
#4. A fundamentally incorrect view of his raison d'être: the economist sees "Homo economicus" as a "Bayesian utility maximizer", rather than "Homo sapiens" as a "primate":
"Those who believe society can best be understood as a series of markets begin by positing a rational, calculating individual whose goal is to maximize 'utility.' This premise says everything and nothing, since it is true by definition in all cases. But it is a key aspect of the market model, since it is the behavioral part of the logical argument that whatever the market decides must be optimal." [p. 41, Kuttner, 1997]
"Neoclassical economics is based on the premise that models that characterize rational, optimizing behavior also characterize actual human behavior." (R. Thaler, 1987).
"One of the peculiarities of economics is that it still rests on a behavioral assumption -- rational utility maximization -- that has long since been rejected by sociologists and psychologists who specialize in studying human behavior. Rational individual utility (income) maximization was the common assumption of all social science in the nineteenth century, but only economics continues to use it.
"Contrary behavioral evidence has had little impact on economics because having a theory of how the world "ought" to act, economists can reject all manner of evidence showing that individuals are not rational utility maximizers. Actions that are not rational maximizations exist, but they are labeled "market imperfections" that "ought" to be eliminated. Individual economic actors "ought" to be rational utility maximizers and they can be taught to do what they "ought" to do. Prescription dominates description in economics, while the reverse is true in the other social sciences that study real human behavior." [ p. 216, DANGEROUS CURRENTS, by Lester Thurow; Random, 1983; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0394723686/brainfood.a ; http://dieoff.com/page162.htm ]
Economic Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon: "Subjective expected utility (SEU) theory lies at the foundation of most contemporary economics. In the probabilistic version of SEU theory, Bayes's rule prescribes how people should take account of new information and how they should respond to incomplete information. But empirical studies find that decision makers often overreact to new information, in violation of Bayes's rule." [ DECISION MAKING AND PROBLEM SOLVING, by Herbert A. Simon and Associates; National Academy Press, 1986; http://dieoff.com/page163.htm ]
In other words, contemporary economics and econometrics is WRONG from the bottom up -- and economists know it. The entire discipline of economics is based on a lie. Moreover, if human behavior is not the result of mathematical calculation -- and it isn't -- then in principle, it's impossible for economists to EVER get it right.
#5. A fundamentally incorrect view of economic élan vital: the economist sees economic activity as a function of infinite "money creation", rather than a function of finite "energy stocks" and finite "energy flows".
Economic students are taught that banks "create" money every time they make a loan, and that the economy is powered by money instead of energy. The juxtaposition of these two data (the first is true, the second is false) leads even Nobel Prize-winning economists to conclude they have discovered a perpetual-motion machine:
"Should we be taking steps to limit the use of these most precious stocks of society's capital so that they will still be available for our grandchildren? . Economists ask, Would future generations benefit more from larger stocks of natural capital such as oil, gas, and coal or from more produced capital such as additional scientists, better laboratories, and libraries linked together by information superhighways? ... in the long run, oil and gas are not essential." [ p. 328, ECONOMICS, Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus; McGraw-Hill, 1998; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0070579474/brainfood.a ]
No person has had a greater influence on the thinking of experts who have become government regulators of the world's oil and gas industries than economist Morris Adelman: "There are plenty of fossil fuels and no limit to potential electrical capacity. It is all a matter of money." [ p. 483, THE ECONOMICS OF PETROLEUM SUPPLY, by M. A. Adelman; MIT, 1993; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262011387/brainfood.a ]
But of course, economists like Samuelson, Nordhaus, and Adelman are wrong. The First and Second Laws of thermodynamics tells us there is a limit to potential electrical capacity -- it's not all a matter of "money", it's all a matter of "energy".
The sudden -- and surprising -- end of the fossil fuel age will stun everyone -- and kill billions. Once the truth is told about gas and oil (it's just a matter of time), your life will change forever
Envision a world where freezing, starving people burn everything combustible -- everything from forests (releasing CO2; destroying topsoil and species); to garbage dumps (releasing dioxins, PCBs, and heavy metals); to people (by waging nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional war); and you have seen the future.
Envision a world utterly destroyed by a lethal education.
The Long Version, by Jay Hanson -- http://www.dieoff.org/
(Permission to reprint explicitly granted.)
Modern economics is nothing more than "Social Darwinism" (the politics -- NOT the science) as first revealed by God to the Dominican Friar St. Thomas Aquinas 750 years ago, and then perfected by the Physiocrats 230 years ago. Unfortunately, God didn't bother to reveal the Laws of Thermodynamics to St. Thomas at the same time as he was doing "free markets". But then it's not too surprising considering the fact that God also neglected to mention that the Earth orbited the Sun.
Any ONE fundamental error in Neoclassical theory should be sufficient reason to reject conclusions based upon that theory. Here are five fundamental errors in the theory:
#1. A fundamentally incorrect "method": the economist uses "correlation" and "post hoc, ergo propter hoc" (after-the-fact) reasoning, rather than the "scientific method" and biological theories of behavior:
"Economists enamored of pure markets begin with the theory, and hang models on assumptions that cannot themselves be challenged. The characteristic grammatical usage is an unusual subjunctive -- the verb form 'must be.' For example, if wages for manual workers are declining, it must be that their economic value is declining. If a corporate raider walks away from a deal with half a billion dollars, it must be that he added that much value to the economy. If Japan can produce better autos than Detroit, there must be some inherent locational logic, else the market would not dictate that result. If commercial advertising leads consumers to buy shoddy or harmful products, they must be 'maximizing their utility' -- because we know by assumption that consumers always maximize their utility. How do we know that? Because to do anything else would be irrational. And how do we know that individuals always behave rationally? Because that is the premise from which we begin. The truly interesting institutional questions -- the disjunctures between what free-market assumptions would predict and the actual outcomes -- are dismissed by the tautological and deductive form of reasoning. The fact that the real world is already far from a perfect market is ignored for the sake of theoretic convenience. The dissenter cannot challenge the theory; he can only describe the real world." [p. 9]
"There is at the core of the celebration of markets a relentless tautology. If we begin, by assumption, with the premise that nearly everything can be understood as a market and that markets optimize outcomes, then everything else leads back to the same conclusion -- marketize! If, in the event, a particular market doesn't optimize, there is only one possible inference: it must be insufficiently marketlike. This epistemological sleight of hand is an astonishing blend that blurs the descriptive with the normative. It is a no-fail system for guaranteeing that theory trumps evidence. Should some human activity not, in fact, behave like an efficient market, it must be the result of some interference that should be removed or a stubborn human refusal to appreciate markets. It cannot possibly be that the theory fails to specify accurately how human behavior works." [p. 6, EVERYTHING FOR SALE, Robert Kuttner; Knopf, 1997; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0394583922 ]
"It was not the methods of science that were appropriated by the early neoclassicals as it was the appearances of science, for the early neoclassicals possessed a singularly inept understanding of the physics they so admired… [ Neoclassical economists attempt ] to reduce all social institutions such as money, property rights, and the market itself to epiphenomena of individual constrained optimization calculation. All these attempts have failed, despite their supposed dependence upon mathematical rigor, because they always inadvertently assume what they aim to deduce… Conservation principles are the key to the understanding of a mathematical formulation of any phenomenon, and it has been there that the neoclassicals have been woefully negligent." [ p. 6, AGAINST MECHANISM: Protecting Economics from Science, by Philip Mirowski; Rowman and Littlefield, 1988; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0847676951 ]
"My analysis showed that the neoclassical theorist of economic behavior is confronted with the dilemma of restricting his or her analysis to a case-by-case taxonomy of individual agent choice, given the inaccessibility to mental states, or grounding his or her explanatory theories on the normative heuristic of rational choice. Neither alternative yields scientific results." [p. 151, SCIENCE, RATIONALITY, AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS, L.D. Keita; Delaware, 1992; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0874134102 ]
SCIENTIFIC METHOD
The "scientific method" is the ONLY way yet discovered for discovering truth amid a world of lies and delusion. The simple version looks something like this:
a. Observe some aspect of the universe.
b. Invent a theory that is consistent with what you have observed.
c. Use the theory to make predictions.
d. Test those predictions by experiments or further observations.
e. Modify the theory in the light of your results.
Go to step c. [ http://www.xnet.com/~blatura/skep_1.html]
ECONOMIST METHOD (by analogy)
Did I ever tell you about my cat? I have a cat that can predict the stock market!!!!!
I got this cat about ten years ago from an old lady who said that it could predict the stock market. She said that if the cat "meowed", the stock market would go up on that day. I didn't believe it at first, but sure-enough it was true. Over the last nine years the cat was right more than it was wrong -- I made millions.
About a year ago, a car killed my cat. I really loved that cat so I had it stuffed and put on the wall. You know what? The cat doesn't meow anymore, but the stock market doesn't go up anymore either. So I am beginning to think that the cat actually CAUSED the stock market to go up or down. Numbers don't lie do they?
Now I am not sure whether the meow was cause or effect... I am sure I can find out which by studying economics. (Although some say there are virtually an infinite number of explanations for the same observation, and only the "scientific method" can separate fact from fiction.)
What do you think? Was the meow cause or effect? Or both? Or neither? Economists run into this problem all the time...
#2. A fundamentally inverted world view: the economist sees the environment as a subsystem of the economy, rather than the other way around. In other words, economists are trained to believe that natural resources come from "markets" rather than the "environment". The historical analogy is Johann Kepler and Tycho Brahe watching the dawn together. Kepler sees the sun come into view as the earth turns; Brahe sees the sun begin its daily journey around a static earth.
The corollary is that economists believe that "man-made capital" can substitute for "natural capital". Nobel Laureate Robert Solow:"... the world can, in effect, get along without natural resources ... at some finite cost, production can be freed of dependence on exhaustible resources altogether... [ 1974 lecture to the American Economic Association cited in p. 117, STEADY-STATE ECONOMICS, Herman E. Daly; Island Press, 1991; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/155963071X ]
But the First Law of thermodynamics tells us there is no "creation" -- there is no such thing as "man-made capital". Thus, ALL capital is "natural capital", and the economy is 100% dependent on the "environment" for everything.
#3. A fundamentally incorrect view of "money": the economist sees "money" as nothing more than a medium of exchange, rather than as social power -- or "political power":
"MONEY: Anything which is widely acceptable in exchange for goods, or in settling debts, not for itself but because it can be similarly passed on, has the character of money since it serves the primary function of money, i.e. a means of payment. As a means of payment money is an entity which is transferred when a payment is made; as such it acts as a MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE, a function essential to any economy other than the most primitive." [ p. 285, THE MIT DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, Fourth Edition; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262660784/brainfood.a ].
But even the casual observer can see that money is social power because it "empowers" people to buy and do the things they want -- including buying and doing other people: politics.
If employers have the freedom to pay workers less "political power", then they will retain more political power for themselves. Money is, in a word, "coercion", and "economic efficiency" is correctly seen as a political concept designed to conserve social power for those who have it -- to make the politically powerful, even more powerful, and the politically weak, even weaker.
For a surrealistic glimpse into the utterly insane world of a typical economist, see http://minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr140.pdf
#4. A fundamentally incorrect view of his raison d'être: the economist sees "Homo economicus" as a "Bayesian utility maximizer", rather than "Homo sapiens" as a "primate":
"Those who believe society can best be understood as a series of markets begin by positing a rational, calculating individual whose goal is to maximize 'utility.' This premise says everything and nothing, since it is true by definition in all cases. But it is a key aspect of the market model, since it is the behavioral part of the logical argument that whatever the market decides must be optimal." [p. 41, Kuttner, 1997]
"Neoclassical economics is based on the premise that models that characterize rational, optimizing behavior also characterize actual human behavior." (R. Thaler, 1987).
"One of the peculiarities of economics is that it still rests on a behavioral assumption -- rational utility maximization -- that has long since been rejected by sociologists and psychologists who specialize in studying human behavior. Rational individual utility (income) maximization was the common assumption of all social science in the nineteenth century, but only economics continues to use it.
"Contrary behavioral evidence has had little impact on economics because having a theory of how the world "ought" to act, economists can reject all manner of evidence showing that individuals are not rational utility maximizers. Actions that are not rational maximizations exist, but they are labeled "market imperfections" that "ought" to be eliminated. Individual economic actors "ought" to be rational utility maximizers and they can be taught to do what they "ought" to do. Prescription dominates description in economics, while the reverse is true in the other social sciences that study real human behavior." [ p. 216, DANGEROUS CURRENTS, by Lester Thurow; Random, 1983; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0394723686/brainfood.a ; http://dieoff.com/page162.htm ]
Economic Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon: "Subjective expected utility (SEU) theory lies at the foundation of most contemporary economics. In the probabilistic version of SEU theory, Bayes's rule prescribes how people should take account of new information and how they should respond to incomplete information. But empirical studies find that decision makers often overreact to new information, in violation of Bayes's rule." [ DECISION MAKING AND PROBLEM SOLVING, by Herbert A. Simon and Associates; National Academy Press, 1986; http://dieoff.com/page163.htm ]
In other words, contemporary economics and econometrics is WRONG from the bottom up -- and economists know it. The entire discipline of economics is based on a lie. Moreover, if human behavior is not the result of mathematical calculation -- and it isn't -- then in principle, it's impossible for economists to EVER get it right.
#5. A fundamentally incorrect view of economic élan vital: the economist sees economic activity as a function of infinite "money creation", rather than a function of finite "energy stocks" and finite "energy flows".
Economic students are taught that banks "create" money every time they make a loan, and that the economy is powered by money instead of energy. The juxtaposition of these two data (the first is true, the second is false) leads even Nobel Prize-winning economists to conclude they have discovered a perpetual-motion machine:
"Should we be taking steps to limit the use of these most precious stocks of society's capital so that they will still be available for our grandchildren? . Economists ask, Would future generations benefit more from larger stocks of natural capital such as oil, gas, and coal or from more produced capital such as additional scientists, better laboratories, and libraries linked together by information superhighways? ... in the long run, oil and gas are not essential." [ p. 328, ECONOMICS, Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus; McGraw-Hill, 1998; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0070579474/brainfood.a ]
No person has had a greater influence on the thinking of experts who have become government regulators of the world's oil and gas industries than economist Morris Adelman: "There are plenty of fossil fuels and no limit to potential electrical capacity. It is all a matter of money." [ p. 483, THE ECONOMICS OF PETROLEUM SUPPLY, by M. A. Adelman; MIT, 1993; http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262011387/brainfood.a ]
But of course, economists like Samuelson, Nordhaus, and Adelman are wrong. The First and Second Laws of thermodynamics tells us there is a limit to potential electrical capacity -- it's not all a matter of "money", it's all a matter of "energy".
The sudden -- and surprising -- end of the fossil fuel age will stun everyone -- and kill billions. Once the truth is told about gas and oil (it's just a matter of time), your life will change forever
Envision a world where freezing, starving people burn everything combustible -- everything from forests (releasing CO2; destroying topsoil and species); to garbage dumps (releasing dioxins, PCBs, and heavy metals); to people (by waging nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional war); and you have seen the future.
Envision a world utterly destroyed by a lethal education.
Friday, May 05, 2006
TRANSCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW
Matthew R. Simmons
Chairman, Simmons & Company, Int'l &
Author, Twilight in the Desert
April 29, 2006
"Tough Times Ahead for Energy"
[Edited for clarity]
JIM PUPLAVA: Well, energy prices are back on the front pages in the news stories today. Some think energy prices will stabilize, maybe they’ll come down a bit, while others think we’re headed for the perfect energy storm. To discuss this issue, joining me on the program is Matt Simmons, he’s Chairman of Simmons and Company International, and he's also author of a best-selling book Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy.
You know, Matt, the last time that we spoke was last August, and little did we know a few weeks later our whole energy infrastructure would be devastated by a good series of hurricanes. I would have thought that our hurricanes would have been our 9/11 or energy wake-up call, and yet I was surprised by the lack of response, and since then we’ve done very little. I believe we still don’t understand the gravity of our energy situation.
MATTHEW R. SIMMONS: You’re precisely right, and ironically you could argue that they were almost the reverse. There was this general sense by too many people that the only reason we have these temporary problems is because of these abnormal hurricanes. I’ll tell you a very odd story. I was on a BBC global radio program and it was the Tuesday afternoon after Katrina. They had a senior professor emeritus from Erasmus University on, who’s written a book called Hydrocarbon in the 21st Century [Peter Odell - Why Carbon Fuels Will Dominate the 21st Century's Global Energy Economy], and he claims we’ll be using twice as much oil in 2100 as we are today because oil in fact is renewable.
And so both of us were asked, since oil prices were at $70, do you think now this is the ultimate oil crisis? And the Professor said, “Oh, no, no, no – this is just a series of exogenous events, and within about 3 months it will all be corrected, and then oil prices will go to 35.” He said, “Mr. Simmons, what do you think?” I said, “first, I don’t know what ‘exogenous’ even means, but I think what Katrina did was actually bomb the Gulf of Mexico the same way [they] bombed Pearl Harbor. And we’re not even through the hurricane season yet and I think we’ll be very lucky if in 3 months we’ll even know the extent of the damage. And I think it will be a miracle if we have everything fixed before the next hurricane season starts in the Summer of 2006.”
And it turns out I was unerringly right, but the fact is that we had very funny oil statistics that came out when all of a sudden people couldn’t drive, and we had no way to count barrels in the areas where most of the storage was, and it created the illusion the high prices had really brought demand down. And so we had a price collapse. [3:12]
JIM: That’s absolutely amazing. Well, let’s move forward if we can to today’s headlines of record gas prices. Matt, how much of this is attributable to new government regulations on let’s say, sulfur content, and last year’s energy legislation requiring ethanol, and of course higher oil prices? I wonder if you could explain these changes and the impact they’ve made on gasoline prices.
MATT: The switch from MTBE to ethanol was, in my opinion, largely overlooked at such an unbelievably complex series of logistics we were putting on the system. And I wouldn’t be terribly surprised if we are basically days away from having gas lines erupt in a lot of key places. But I don’t think, so far, that’s really been the driver. I think the driver of gasoline and diesel prices is crude oil, and the fact that crude oil is back up in the mid-70s. And the reason it’s in the mid-70s, in my opinion, is we’re out of capacity every place. So I think the switch to ethanol and coming right behind it is this unbelievable specification for ultra-clean diesel fuel is probably something that doesn’t work. And that might be the triggering point for the same sort of gas lines we had in '79, but I think in the background is just the serious problem of the fact that this is just exactly where current prices should be if you think there’s nothing abnormal about crude oil being at 75. And every time I’m asked how in the world you could justify $75 price for oil, I say -- it’s in barrels: $75 happens to be 11 cents a cup. [There is] nothing we sell any place in the world for 11 cents a cup other than oil to refineries. [4:58]
JIM: In response, however, to these higher prices over the weekend, we have two Senators, one Democrat Carl Levin of Michigan, and Arlen Specter, a Republican of Pennsylvania, they propose a windfall profits tax, and in Specter’s case anti-trust legislation, and some Congressmen are talking about price controls. What would these proposals do to alleviate our current energy problem, if not exacerbate them?
MATT: Well, the price controls is really stupid because then that basically artificially just encourages consumption. I think at some point I’m a little – I hate to say this because it’s so counter anything I thought I would ever say – but to the extent that the major oil companies can continue to advertise that they’re really not making much money, and that they’re doing everything possible and that these are just temporary, and the cash builds up, and builds up, and builds up, and builds up, the governments of the world are going to basically take it away from them. Now, whether they should or not is a whole different reason, but I think had the companies been more forthright about and maybe they had done their homework a little better and said, “we are in a jam now and we’re not quite sure how we get out of it,” it would be easier to defend these prices. But what they’ve done is exactly the opposite, you know, “and this is just very temporary, oil’s a cyclical thing, what goes up comes down, over 15 years we’ve spent all this money.” And you know it won’t be long before one of the major oil companies has $100 billion of excess cash on the balance sheet. [6:29]
JIM: In the meantime, since Katrina and Rita, and others following – heck, we’re already into a new season…
MATT: Yup, the one thing we’ll know about the new season is that they’ve taken Rita and Katrina out of the hurricane language.
JIM: Since then, looking back however, we haven’t built a refinery, we’re not building wind turbines and we’ve done nothing with the rail system, are we committing energy suicide.
MATT: We’re certainly playing a game of Russian roulette or chicken. Now, both of those games have actually created over the years occasional suicide.
JIM: When you sit, however, and look at the way this is debated, I don’t believe the nation or many citizens understand how critical energy is to the economy, and the lifestyle we enjoy in this country from water, food production, technology to healthcare.
MATT: I’ve had the luxury of actually speaking in quite a few different places around the world over the course of the last 4 months and I would say that don’t just blame the United States for our ignorance, we’re basically just about as educated…last Thursday I spent a fabulous day at the University of Limerick in Ireland, and the question I got repeatedly asked, “why haven’t people come here and told us this story? This is shocking!” And I got the same reaction in New Zealand, and the same reaction in Aberdeen, Scotland. So we basically got 30 years of very, very low prices that got lower and lower because they never rose. So an inflation-adjusted basis really led us into dreaming that we had the right to basically get energy effectively for free and we could worry about other things. [8:12]
JIM: From my chair it almost looks, Matt, that we’re heading into a perfect energy storm. On one storm front you have supply versus demand; on the second, geopolitical issues. And then maybe a third storm front, a lack of a silver bullet, and even if there was something out there, it's the long lead time on alternatives.
MATT: Yes, and then you have all these flashpoints – the fact that the energy infrastructure is too old and it’s rusting away. Each one of these things is a separate issue.
JIM: Describe the origins of this crisis. How did we get into this predicament?
MATT: Well, if you wanted basically to go back and say when the seeds were really started: they were started when I was a kid in the '50s, and the world began believing that the Middle East had unlimited amounts of oil that we had barely just started to find, and its costs were so inexpensive that our biggest problem was basically how do we keep the world from being flooded with too much of it. So we have some sort of diversity of supply. At the same time, we're finalizing atomic energy. There was a debate going on – and this was long before I can remember about it, I’ve just gone and read about it out of curiosity – atomic energy was going to be so free that it didn’t actually warrant creating meters, the meters were way too expensive. Just give it to people for free.
So we kind of laid a foundation of an illusion that we could basically rely on effectively very expensive energy forever, and that the cornucopia of all cornucopias was in the Middle East. What amazes me is that it would appear to me now from a lot of feedback I’ve had that until I stumbled into the curiosity of finding these technical papers, and spent 2 ½ years working on what came out last June, and my book Twilight in the Desert, nobody had actually ever questioned the whole card. We just basically assumed. And so many people assumed it. It was one of those things. There’s no reason to ask how do you know that, because everybody knows it.
And then we made another egregious assumption or mistake – we created satellite TV, and out of that we let the whole world peek on how we lived. As a result China and India and Pakistan and Bolivia said, “I’d really love to live like those people in Canada and the United States do – and Europe. That really looks neat.” So we set the seeds [where] demand is going to grow forever and obviously we’ll be able to supply it because technology is making supply easier and easier to do, and we’ve always got the Middle East. And the problem is that demand was too young and supply was too old and we were giving the energy away for free. [11:03]
JIM: Something that relates to this is I believe that a lot of economists, analysts or forecasters have missed out that by the end of the 20th Century, this energy miracle that we experienced in the latter half of the 20th Century – actually throughout the 20th Century – had become globalized at that point. So now we’re dealing with emerging economic giants such as China and India – this is something that we didn’t have to deal with, let’s say in the '81 recession.
MATT: Oh heavens no. No, you’re absolutely right. And I’ll tell you what I don’t find very amusing is how many of these name-plate economists say, “well, what we all missed was China,” because I love to remind people that I wrote a white paper in the Summer of 1997 called China’s Insatiable Energy Needs, and I predicted that by 2005 that they would basically be using 6 ½ million barrels a day of oil – and that’s exactly what they were. So, all you had to do was actually go to China and have your eyes open. [11:56]
JIM: Matt, if we were looking at the energy situation in the '50s and '60s, things looked pretty bright. Then we got a wakeup call in the '70s. Then in the '80s and '90s, the pendulum swung again to the bright side. Now, I think we’re dealing with reality again, but this time I think it’s more serious.
MATT: The wake-up call we got in the '70s was a fire drill that actually created the illusion that the only thing we have to worry about is a fire in the back office. And what I mean by that is it was basically we need to be careful if these dangerous countries in the Middle East don’t artificially hold oil off the market. And as long as they don’t artificially do that, we’ll never ever have a problem. Whereas the real problem was the fact that basically in about 20 or 30 more years, their oil fields – unless they suddenly found any more – were going to be so old and they were going to go into decline. And no one ever took the time to worry about that. We actually got the classic ‘general fighting the last war.’ [12:54]
JIM: Now, in the '80s and '90s, we experienced an almost two-decade oil depression. How did this reshape the energy landscape and how did it change our thinking? I mean we went from an era of conservation to one of over consumption: cars got bigger and got less mileage; homes got bigger and were built further away from where people worked. How did that change the landscape in the sense of not only what we did economically, but maybe does that explain some of the thinking of oil company executives today?
MATT: Well, first of all, it codified several concepts in the conventional wisdom that turned out all to be wrong. The first was that we had a new suite of technology that was going to allow us to bring oil prices down lower and lower and people could be successful at it. And the technology meant that we had to drill fewer wells, so we didn’t worry about the fact that we let our drilling rigs rust away; and we didn’t worry about the fact that almost no new people came into the industry, because somehow we were going to do it through robotics, and GPS systems, and so forth. And literally there was some whacko people – there are still some whacko people – that are very prominent speakers that talk about digitized oil fields, and GPS systems and you know, satellites and so forth, and they’re just absolutely Buck Rogers – they should become Jules Verne.
And in the meantime, [for] the oil companies the technology created decline curves that were far steeper than they had ever been before because they were basically pulling the harder crumbs out of the ground at a faster and faster rate. And we didn’t find very many things of any size. And then because we were drilling fewer wells, we basically could end up very aggressively doing reserve estimations so you could kind of plug your F&D costs to your peers so you’d get the same amount of bonus. So we really went through a decade of imagining reserve additions. Had there not been this whistleblower at Shell Oil company in February 2004 who sent this big document kit to the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, we never would have had this revelation that most reserves had been made up. The whole thing turned out to be a very unfortunate two decades where we dug ourselves in a very deep hole based on just one myth after another. [15:19]
JIM: Well, you know, a lot of those myths are still with us because out of the '80s and '90s we developed some pretty strong opinions that still exist today: that demand growth would slow down, that the cost of energy would get cheaper, technology would solve the problem, and we had in reserve non-conventional energy which would become abundant and profitable.
MATT: Yup, and unfortunately non-conventional energy takes an awful lot of conventional energy used up to make it useable, so we’re turning gold into lead.
JIM: Haven’t the facts, though, disputed a lot of these assumptions and yet they still exist?
MATT: Well, you know, the problem is that there really weren’t a lot of people that really had the time and inclination to actually doggedly chase down the facts, and there were an awful lot of people that basically loved to give the same talk because they’d heard it ten times so it must be right. And what’s been going on in the last 2 to 3 years is the beginning of an enormously important debate between what are sort of euphemistically called the optimists and the pessimists. And I know most of the optimists. And I know most of the pessimists. The optimists don’t have any facts. They have some firm hunches and beliefs. And the pessimists tend to be scientists who aren’t necessarily very good communicators. People in the audience tend to want to hear good news anyway and a lot of these optimists are very humorous speakers. They make great jokes and then wise people say, “well, the real answer must be half way between.”
But I have to tell you I am very encouraged over the course of the last year by the way the media has reacted. I think the media is doing fabulous work. I think there are at least 50 times more good speakers than there were two years ago on this subject who have done their homework. I think it helped that we ended up having a seven-fold rise in oil prices to start opening people’s eyes. About 100,000 people have read my book, which I think has opened some eyes. I’ve had so many people compliment me that I’m really humbled by it, saying, “you know, whether you’re totally right or slightly off, at least we’ll never again just merrily assume that the Middle East had unlimited amounts of oil.” [17:38]
JIM: The thing that sometimes surprises me when you turn on some of the financial stations you will hear an anchor saying, “how long will these prices persist?” And it’s almost a belief that maybe the high prices and the spikes that we’ve seen especially recently, are somewhat of an aberration. Remember after Katrina when they spiked at '70, they went down the next couple of months. And every time we seem to have these spikes, they always retreat. So everybody says, “Aha, this is what will happen again.”
MATT: Yup, and the oil bears, which there’s still herds of, come out and say, “OK, I told you so.” So that’s why I’m encouraged by the amount of increase in the dialog – I’m really discouraged that we actually haven’t had anything close to a listening to the alarm ringing, let alone a wake-up call.
JIM: Well given where we are today then what are the real questions we should be asking today, versus where the focus is?
MATT: We should be asking ourselves is it wise to ignore the reality of peak oil until it’s too late to fix it? Then we should ask ourselves if we recognize the problem is either here or approaching the front door, how quickly can we basically work out some sort of a global cooperation agreement so that we really significantly change the consumption of how we use oil in the transportation markets, so we don’t end up having a really awful tipping point. Now, those are the questions we ought to be asking ourselves. [19:11]
JIM: Yet, I get the IEA book every single year, and if you take a look at the government, the EIA [or the International Energy Agency], they all assume that the energy supply will be there to meet future demand.
MATT: I know. They have accidentally become cheer leaders for peace in our time. I’ve gotten to know quite a few of these people, and sadly enough I think they actually believe what they say. I think it would maybe I guess a little bit more comforting if they know that that’s not right, but they are just paid to say that. [19:42]
JIM: You know what’ll happen, and this happens with the optimist camp, they will cite these numbers of where future demand is going to be, and future supply is going to be there as well. And somebody with that kind of authority, you know to somebody that may not be familiar with all of this, that is almost very soothing.
MATT: It’s very soothing. But again, I have to say that I might be hallucinating, but I’m winning the PR war right now.
JIM: Well, you know, the one great thing I would say is [with] books like yours – Twilight in the Desert, which is an eye-opener and if our listeners have not read this book I highly recommend you pick up a copy – there are a plethora of voices however that [say] peak oil is a distant issue, and we’ve seen them on television this week.
MATT: I know all of them, but they’ll probably actually argue that until we go over Niagara Falls. But on the other hand, you know, there are precedents of this. If you go back and look at the history of…what’s really amazing is the weekend before Pearl Harbor, World War II was basically 25% over, and there were still people passionately saying the United States will never be at war, because they didn’t want the United States to be at war, it was inconvenient.
JIM: Just as peak oil.
MATT: Yes.
JIM: But what are executives thinking? I mean, I saw the January automobile shows. I’ve seen General Motors talk about a new lineup of SUVs, and the irony of the recent spike in gas prices they were – I think it was CNBC – interviewing some consumers and here’s a guy putting gas into his SUV and he’s upset about the price.
MATT: Yes, but you know, you’ve got to remember that sticker shock is totally different than prices really being high. And it was so interesting to come back from this trip to Italy and Ireland and see that they’re basically paying close to $7 a US gallon. And they’re kind of annoyed, as we are, because they would think it ought to be $4, which it was a couple of years ago.
But again, I continue to always convert it – because it is just so easy to – back into a cup, because if you go and order coffee, tea or wine or water, you basically buy it by the cup, and when you’re paying $3.20 a gallon in the United States is 20 cents a cup. And 45 cents of the $3.20 is taxes. Can you name me anything you can buy for 20 cents a cup anymore, other than gasoline?
JIM: Nothing.
MATT: And then when you say $75 a barrel – 11 cents a cup – refiners are the only purchasers in the world that can still buy valuable things at 11 cents a cup. I was asked in Ireland, “what do you think oil should sell for?”
“Well,” I said, “for the things that you think are dear. What do you pay for Irish whiskey?” I think basically the answer is on a per barrel basis about $4,000 a barrel.
JIM: If you look at it a six-pack of Coke, it is actually more expensive than if we were to take equivalent of gasoline.
MATT: Yes, a cup of gasoline sounds so trivial, but the reality is if you have access to a passenger car, you can basically get six people in it, some stuff in the trunk, and go two miles for 20 cents. Have you ever tried to negotiate with a guy on a donkey and a cart: “will you take me and my five friends 2 miles for 20 cents.” That guy’s going to swear at you for being stupid.
JIM: Well, why don’t you give us a run down on some of the cold hard facts, and this is something I really want to get to, and you do a good job of this in Twilight, regarding reserve additions and production profiles of the major producing countries because one statistics you will hear the optimists throw out continuously, “well, we have 175 billion barrels in the Canadian tar sands.”
MATT: Yup, it’s too bad we even have reserve data, because it’s so meaningless, and it’s so unreliable, and it doesn’t tell you anything about how much a country or company can produce in the next 2 to 3 years. And any time you start commingling light sweet oil that can come out of a pressurized well bore – one well bore – at the rate of 40,000 barrels a day, or 10,000 barrels a day with heavy oil from Canada [where] it costs you $10 billion per 100,000 barrel a day production, you’re really commingling Maseratis with jalopies, and some are saying, “I have a thousand vehicles.” It’s used all the time by the optimists and they don’t have any idea what they’re talking about.
What’s really also interesting is how little data we have of any quality about how much we have left of high quality sweet oil. And the answer is most of the key crude grades are basically now very tiny in their volumes. What we’ve made it up with is basically a lesser rating quality of crude that has a higher degree of sour properties in them, and poisonous gases and is also heavier. And what we’re doing in the heavy oil is chewing through natural gas primarily as a heat source and potable water too often to create steam to melt it into basically low quality crude. And that’s where I say, “Gentlemen, we have just turned gold into lead.” [25:07]
JIM: You know it was interesting after our interview last August, and having read your book and talking about the very likelihood of peak oil being upon our front door, we saw last year that Kuwait’s Burgan field, and Mexico’s Cantarell field peaking. Aren’t these examples of the first canaries starting to sing?
MATT: The day that the Chairman of Kuwait Petroleum Corporation announced that the great Burgan complex is exhausted that’s six decades of 2 million barrels a day, I said, “that’s the first canary in the mine shaft starting to sing.” Cantarell, that’s a very serious issue for the United States. Because if Cantarell has finished, wrapped up, over its tertiary recovery program, we don’t have a term in the oil for ‘quadrutiary’ recovery. So, it’s over. And if that actually falls to anywhere nearly as low as 500,000 barrels a day by 2009, Mexico will not be exporting oil to the United States, and that puts Hugo Chavez in an unbelievably powerful catbird seat to dictate terms to us as to the conditions under which he will sell us his heavy oil. [26:21]
JIM: The frightening thing about all of this - and you’ve used several analogies about our energy gauges are broken, despite being the largest industry in the world – the energy industry – it lacks transparency, something you have argued for a long time. But most people would be surprised to learn that most petroleum stocks are mostly computer guesses.
MATT: Yes – petroleum ‘stocks’ being inventory versus equities. We don’t have a fuel gauge that basically says, “oh, we’re almost empty.”
JIM: That’s kind of scary. Let’s say if you’ve got your buddies, you have 5 or 6 people in the car and you’re going across the Arizona desert and you have no idea what your fuel gauge is saying.
MATT: Yes, it’s interesting. At various times when I’ve been speaking at fairly large groups I ask a question, “is there anybody in the audience that’s run out of gas, please raise your hand.” It’s amazing but about 75-80% of the people in the audience always raise their hand. Almost everyone has had the indignity of sooner or later forgetting to look at the gas gauge and running out of gas. And you can be driving 75 miles an hour and one second later your car stops. We have gauges, but we forget to look at them. Here we don’t have a gauge. [27:31]
JIM: That’s a real problem if you take a look at any forecast for economic growth whether you’re talking about China, India, the United States, Europe, it’s all based on increased energy consumption. So if you’re talking about everything that we need for the necessities of life whether it’s growing food or getting basic goods to the stores that all requires energy. What happens when that energy isn’t there, or you can’t get enough of what you need?
MATT: Well, what happens is basically what we need disappears. See, that’s the irony. We’ll never run out of oil but we can easily run out of food on the shelves, and cars on the street, and it doesn’t mean we’ve run out of oil. It just means that we have no more useable oil in the system. When you run out of gas in a car, it doesn’t mean there’s no gasoline left. It’s just you don’t have any gasoline in your tank. [28:24]
JIM: Do you think, given these circumstances – I mean if you take a look at energy being on the front pages, the President mentioned it in his State of the Union message and he gave a major speech today – is this a growing recognition by Washington and the politicians that this is a serious issue that’s not going away?
MATT: I certainly think it is. I think history will actually remember President Bush’s State of the Union [where he] mentioned that it is time for America to end our addiction to oil, as one of the really major turning points in the thinking process of the United States of America. I’m not saying that from a partisan standpoint. I’d say the same thing if that had been said by President Clinton. [29:07]
JIM: I want to move on to something that is very difficult to assess or even predict, and that’s an aspect of energy which is geopolitics. I can think of several flashpoints – Middle East, Nigeria, Venezuela, the Straits of Malacca – just how vulnerable are we to a sudden supply disruption?
MATT: If we had 5 or 6 or 10 million barrels a day of spare shut-in capacity, the answer is not really, not very vulnerable. But the fact that we don’t have any spare capacity [makes us vulnerable]. Now the Straits of Malacca shutting down is a showstopper. That’s 11 million barrels a day of oil flows that basically allows oil to go from the Middle East and Africa into the Eastern Asian markets. If MEND [is successful], which is the movement to emancipate the Nigerian Delta, they’ve already shut in 650,000 barrels a day of Nigerian oil, and they’re going for all of Exxon’s next. They’ve publicly announced that. Shutting 2 million barrels a day of Nigerian oil that’s really high quality, light oil and it’s a very short distance by tanker from the Niger Delta to the Gulf of Mexico, so that’s another enormous vulnerability. If Mr. Chavez realizes that Cantarell really is now in decline and he announces, “I just don’t quite like the rich people in the United States. I’m willing to supply the US with oil, but only if they can certify that they’ve given it to the poor.” He’d become so popular throughout Latin America you couldn’t believe it. These aren’t all kind of Stephen King novel events. [30:43]
JIM: I’m never surprised when I turn on the TV. In fact I was reading – trying to think of the gentleman’s book on oil – and he was talking about in the chapter an attack on the Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq, and the next morning I get up and I turn on the TV and there it is on the news.
MATT: It’s a very vulnerable facility. And what’s interesting is the good news is they killed the people in the cars, but two of the security guards also got killed. And the fact that they apparently breached the first gate was interesting.
JIM: Each kind of event it seems like they’re getting closer and closer.
MATT: Again, let me tell you an event that would be not terribly difficult for some whacko person to pull off, take a pick up truck and fill it with the same sort of energy that the guys did in Oklahoma City, and park it under the Alyeska pipeline. We have so many fragile choke points today that any of them now matter because we don’t have any spare capacity. [31:48]
JIM: Well, given this, how would you describe where we are today in terms of peak oil and gas? Is it approaching the front door, knocking at the world’s door, or is it now inside the house?
MATT: I think now the more I’ve had a lot of time to get educated about this issue, the closer you get to approaching this is the highest we can produce, the more dangerous it is to produce at that rate. And the safest thing to do is lower your rate of production so you actually don’t have a precipitous decline on the other side. On that standard, I would basically say that peak oil is now inside the front room. And peak natural gas is right behind it and is far more serious and will decline faster than oil because gas is a vapor. [32:32]
JIM: Don’t we have a problem of what remains is in stranded areas? In other words, the United States has gotten a lot of its gas through pipelines from the Gulf of Mexico through imports from Canada. But if we were to continue, we would need to liquefy it, put it in a special ship, and create a special loading dock to receive it (or LNG terminals) and we don’t have enough of them.
MATT: Well, most of the stranded gas we have in the world is of the same quality as the almost unlimited amounts of oil in the Middle East – it’s an illusion. It has not yet been discovered, and we should basically not be calling undiscovered gas a usable energy source. You can call it a theoretical energy source, but until you actually drill wells and drill a lot of appraisal wells and then core the wells so you know what the rock properties are, you have no earthly idea of whether you have usable energy or not.
JIM: And yet here in Southern California we’re building an LNG terminal south of us at the border which is the only place you can build them in California.
MATT: It’s a field of dreams: build me a stadium and the team will be there.
JIM: I want to come back to your book Twilight in the Desert where you talk about a lot of the larger producers have all peaked, recent evidence with Mexico and Cantarell, even Kuwait with Burgan. In your research in Twilight you’re talking about this approaching peak, it seems like everybody – whether you’re looking at the EIA or the IEA – looks towards Saudi Arabia, and yet I don’t know maybe they believe this themselves that they’re going out and say, “well, we’re going to invest this much, and we’re going to take our production up to a certain level,” but I get from reading Twilight you doubt if that’s possible.
MATT: Well, first of all, it is not possible. I’ve had the luxury now of an enormous amount of feedback, including some really senior people within Saudi Aramco that have had the guts to say, “I really love reading your book, you accurately described the unbelievable challenges we’re dealing with.” I think part of the problem that some people there have is they’ve heard for so many years through our experts that they can produce 25 million barrels a day, that they say, “Pssht, sure we can, everybody has told us that.” [34:47]
JIM: Whether they can do that and taking a look at their difficulties, but these are some serious assumptions I think that…
MATT: There are some unbelievable assumptions. When you have gentlemen like Dr. Sadad al-Husseini who has his PhD from Brown University, and he was Executive Vice-President of Saudi Aramco in charge of E&P, and Dr al-Husseini and I have been on two programs together in England, and he’s been quoted in the English papers as saying the West is deluded to rely on Saudi oil. He’s basically said, “over 12 million barrels a day, it just isn’t in the cards.” And he was known in the '90s as the brains of Saudi Aramco, and he’s a fabulous human being. [35:30]
JIM: Let’s go to the optimists’ arguments for a minute and just show how serious this is. I wonder Matt if you would give us a quick rundown of the alternatives: tar sands; nuclear power; wind; solar; clean coal; and biofuels – which are in the headlines.
MATT: The first thing that the optimists rely on is that we always have had reserve appreciation, and so fields over time always get bigger. That happened 50 years ago. There’s not a scrap of data to support that concept for the last 25 years. It’s just wrong. The second concept is embrace technology. All you have to do is be a believer in technology. I continue to remind people that all the oil field technology we’re talking about was being invented in the early '70s when our firm started business. It took a decade to invent it, it took a decade to commercialize it, and it took 15 years to spread it around the world and the blackboard’s bare. There is no more technology of any significance that anybody is working on. So then you get into: look at all the unconventional oil we have that is now commercial. You can make money – if you’ve already paid for your facility and written it off – on oil sands, but oil sands are very different from tar sands. The oil sands can be strip mined and they’re still extremely energy intensive, but tar sands need to have these deep mine shafts of steam put in to melt the [tar] – it’s really basically bitumen, a recycle of La Brea tar pits – you chew up such an intensive amount of energy. And what they’re talking about is undiscovered natural gas in Northern Alberta, and potable river water from the Athabasca River, that to use either one as a steam source to create low quality oil is a crime.
And then they basically talk about – assume – all this stuff we’re basically going to discover, and I say, “you know, give me a break, Cantarell in Mexico was discovered in 1975 and 1976, that’s the last giant oil field we’ve ever found. Prudhoe Bay, the North Sea, and Western Siberia were all discovered in 1968, and that’s the last time we found a large or medium onshore oil field in the Middle East.” 1968 was a long time ago. [37:44]
JIM: What about, for example, Mexico announcing that they discovered a giant oil field, though we don’t know much about it.
MATT: They don’t know much about it because there’s been one well drilled and they haven’t yet cored it. You see until you core a well -- which is really basically a very technically tricky process of going down to the level of the earth where you think the oil rocks are productive, and literally cutting a core, and retrieving it and sending it to a laboratory, and saying let’s test the porosity, let’s test the permeability, you don’t know anything about the reservoir rocks and whether they will flow oil or not. Until you flow test the oil, you know nothing about whether it’s highly free flowing or very, very syrupy molasses. So, drilling a well is an important first step, but until you well test and core, you’re basically just guessing. [38:44]
JIM: What about biofuels?
MATT: There are probably some biofuels that are really good potential solutions, but any biofuel that has to be planted every year is by definition taking a lot of nutrients out of the soil. Unless you’re using very, very cheap labor, you’re using a lot of energy in your tractors and a lot of energy in your fertilizer. Now take sugarcane-based ethanol in Brazil for instance. They basically don’t uproot the cane. They have cheap labor with machetes that hack it, so that’s actually pretty energy-intensive. The work that’s being done on switch grass, which is this fabulous grass we sort of plowed up in most parts of the Midwest that covered the Great Plains and at one time fed 100 million buffalo, as long as you’re not grazing it with buffalo, it grows between 6 and 8 feet in the peak of the season. You cut it with hay machinery, so it regrows the next spring. There’s a lot of promise in those types of fuels. But what we’re doing is we’re promoting things basically for the sake of subsidies and being callously ignorant of the energy intensity. What we can’t afford the luxury of is creating a whole new suite of energy products that are net energy losers. [39:55]
JIM: How would you describe corn ethanol?
MATT: Net energy loser – big time.
JIM: And yet that’s what we just passed and that’s the direction we seem to be going in.
MATT: Yes, and the corn lobby is a very powerful lobby. They love the subsidy, but I think it’s time to kind of get off that stuff.
JIM: Given where we are and what you know, what should we be doing now?
MATT: Getting as educated as can be on how serious these issues are. Getting as educated as can be on how inexpensive energy still is. Start thinking through all the ways we can rapidly reduce the intensity of how we use oil and gas, so that we make sure we don’t basically waste it unnecessarily. Go on an R&D program the likes of which we’ve never done to create some new forms of energy. But I think that won’t happen soon enough.
So we really have to adopt a big conservation plan: liberating people to work wherever they want to, and when they want to, and pay by productivity, could be one of the really great sort of social revolution things that we do in the next 5 years and basically eliminate all the people in places like California and Texas, for instance, who are spending upwards of 4 hours a day crawling to work in traffic and crawling home so they’re mad when they get to work, and they’re mad when they get home, and they were mad when oil was free. Eliminating our kind of compulsive obsession with having exotic food from all around the world in our supermarkets every place 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year – it’s too energy intensive. Growing stuff at home and canning it. And what we really need to do is ultimately reverse this concept of globalization and go back to actually living in what are euphemistically called villages close to where we work, which can be downtown, but it’s just not 3 hours commute. [41:42]
JIM: What about the rail system?
MATT: The rail system needs to be totally overhauled and totally rebuilt, and use the rail system to ship goods and people but in shipping goods only do it as far as you can ship goods to water, and then get goods on marine based transportation, barges or vessels, and use our water system as the way we basically deliver goods as close to where the kind of end point is – sort of like Federal Express does. And we can actually do all of this stuff. I mean if we applied this on a global basis with the same intensity as we had to build the war machine for World War II, we could get this done in 5 to 7 years. [42:24]
JIM: Do you think it’s going to take a crisis to launch that?
MATT: Sure it is. Go back again to where we started. If Katrina and Rita weren’t even looked at as they were flashing yellow lights, it’s going to take a crisis.
JIM: That’s what I fear, Matt. I fear we’re heading into this perfect energy storm because it’s like we’re sitting on the shore, and the sky looks blue, the winds are picking up but about 10 to 15 miles offshore, beyond sight, there’s a hurricane.
MATT: At least there are a lot more people in serious places that are starting to think through than there were about by a huge measure a year ago. But to galvanize the whole system, I think we’re going to have to have some form of an energy 9/11.
JIM: Any final thoughts for our listeners? Let’s say if there’s some skeptics in the crowd because you know we hear stories about abiotic oil, and there’s just a naturally gooey center in the middle of the Earth that replenishes every well in the world, I can’t help but think in terms of that argument that if you were ExxonMobil sitting on that cash that if there was a gooey spot in the earth somewhere, you would be going after it.
MATT: If the abiotic oil theory worked, why didn’t it ever refill any of our depleted oil fields? I think that we have basically created a fool’s paradise, and it’s really time for the fools to wake up and get real because this is actually something that could really destroy our lives, and not our kids’ lives, but our lives. But it doesn’t have to happen that way. [43:53]
JIM: It goes back to something you said mid-way in our conversation: it’s not at the front door, it’s inside the house. Matt, your book Twilight in the Desert did a lot to open people’s eyes. When’s it coming out in paperback?
MATT: In about a month, and also exciting for me is in about 2 months, it comes out in Chinese.
JIM: And the 100,000 copies that have sold globally, which is incredible, what are the sales overseas, has it been as popular there?
MATT: I don’t really know, all I can tell you is on Friday afternoon and I went into my favorite bookstore in London Hatchards, and I couldn’t believe as I walked up the stairs to see a ‘hot items’ [list] with Twilight in the Desert at the top, so I introduced myself to the guy at the desk, and he said, “come up stairs and sign the ten copies we have on the shelves,” and we got there and they were gone, and he’d just filled the shelves up on Thursday afternoon. He said, “we’re having people come in and buy this book five at a time. I can’t believe you wrote it.” You know, for a book that came out in the middle of last June, it’s pretty good news to me. Wiley has decided they’re going to continue publishing the hardback even though usually when the paperback comes out publishers sort of wind up the printing effort on the hardback. [45:06]
JIM: All I can say to my listeners is if you want to get educated, Matt’s book is certainly one of the top of the list because it opens up your eyes whenever you hear about oil being bountiful in the Middle East. Matt, I know you’re a busy person and you have to get off, but I want to thank you as always for giving us a good deal of your time and joining us on the Financial Sense Newshour.
MATT: Well, thank you for the opportunity for being on your program. I enjoyed the conversation last Fall, and I enjoyed it again today.
JIM: Alright, and all the best to you Sir, and may you sell another 100,000 copies.
Matthew R. Simmons
Chairman, Simmons & Company, Int'l &
Author, Twilight in the Desert
April 29, 2006
"Tough Times Ahead for Energy"
[Edited for clarity]
JIM PUPLAVA: Well, energy prices are back on the front pages in the news stories today. Some think energy prices will stabilize, maybe they’ll come down a bit, while others think we’re headed for the perfect energy storm. To discuss this issue, joining me on the program is Matt Simmons, he’s Chairman of Simmons and Company International, and he's also author of a best-selling book Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy.
You know, Matt, the last time that we spoke was last August, and little did we know a few weeks later our whole energy infrastructure would be devastated by a good series of hurricanes. I would have thought that our hurricanes would have been our 9/11 or energy wake-up call, and yet I was surprised by the lack of response, and since then we’ve done very little. I believe we still don’t understand the gravity of our energy situation.
MATTHEW R. SIMMONS: You’re precisely right, and ironically you could argue that they were almost the reverse. There was this general sense by too many people that the only reason we have these temporary problems is because of these abnormal hurricanes. I’ll tell you a very odd story. I was on a BBC global radio program and it was the Tuesday afternoon after Katrina. They had a senior professor emeritus from Erasmus University on, who’s written a book called Hydrocarbon in the 21st Century [Peter Odell - Why Carbon Fuels Will Dominate the 21st Century's Global Energy Economy], and he claims we’ll be using twice as much oil in 2100 as we are today because oil in fact is renewable.
And so both of us were asked, since oil prices were at $70, do you think now this is the ultimate oil crisis? And the Professor said, “Oh, no, no, no – this is just a series of exogenous events, and within about 3 months it will all be corrected, and then oil prices will go to 35.” He said, “Mr. Simmons, what do you think?” I said, “first, I don’t know what ‘exogenous’ even means, but I think what Katrina did was actually bomb the Gulf of Mexico the same way [they] bombed Pearl Harbor. And we’re not even through the hurricane season yet and I think we’ll be very lucky if in 3 months we’ll even know the extent of the damage. And I think it will be a miracle if we have everything fixed before the next hurricane season starts in the Summer of 2006.”
And it turns out I was unerringly right, but the fact is that we had very funny oil statistics that came out when all of a sudden people couldn’t drive, and we had no way to count barrels in the areas where most of the storage was, and it created the illusion the high prices had really brought demand down. And so we had a price collapse. [3:12]
JIM: That’s absolutely amazing. Well, let’s move forward if we can to today’s headlines of record gas prices. Matt, how much of this is attributable to new government regulations on let’s say, sulfur content, and last year’s energy legislation requiring ethanol, and of course higher oil prices? I wonder if you could explain these changes and the impact they’ve made on gasoline prices.
MATT: The switch from MTBE to ethanol was, in my opinion, largely overlooked at such an unbelievably complex series of logistics we were putting on the system. And I wouldn’t be terribly surprised if we are basically days away from having gas lines erupt in a lot of key places. But I don’t think, so far, that’s really been the driver. I think the driver of gasoline and diesel prices is crude oil, and the fact that crude oil is back up in the mid-70s. And the reason it’s in the mid-70s, in my opinion, is we’re out of capacity every place. So I think the switch to ethanol and coming right behind it is this unbelievable specification for ultra-clean diesel fuel is probably something that doesn’t work. And that might be the triggering point for the same sort of gas lines we had in '79, but I think in the background is just the serious problem of the fact that this is just exactly where current prices should be if you think there’s nothing abnormal about crude oil being at 75. And every time I’m asked how in the world you could justify $75 price for oil, I say -- it’s in barrels: $75 happens to be 11 cents a cup. [There is] nothing we sell any place in the world for 11 cents a cup other than oil to refineries. [4:58]
JIM: In response, however, to these higher prices over the weekend, we have two Senators, one Democrat Carl Levin of Michigan, and Arlen Specter, a Republican of Pennsylvania, they propose a windfall profits tax, and in Specter’s case anti-trust legislation, and some Congressmen are talking about price controls. What would these proposals do to alleviate our current energy problem, if not exacerbate them?
MATT: Well, the price controls is really stupid because then that basically artificially just encourages consumption. I think at some point I’m a little – I hate to say this because it’s so counter anything I thought I would ever say – but to the extent that the major oil companies can continue to advertise that they’re really not making much money, and that they’re doing everything possible and that these are just temporary, and the cash builds up, and builds up, and builds up, and builds up, the governments of the world are going to basically take it away from them. Now, whether they should or not is a whole different reason, but I think had the companies been more forthright about and maybe they had done their homework a little better and said, “we are in a jam now and we’re not quite sure how we get out of it,” it would be easier to defend these prices. But what they’ve done is exactly the opposite, you know, “and this is just very temporary, oil’s a cyclical thing, what goes up comes down, over 15 years we’ve spent all this money.” And you know it won’t be long before one of the major oil companies has $100 billion of excess cash on the balance sheet. [6:29]
JIM: In the meantime, since Katrina and Rita, and others following – heck, we’re already into a new season…
MATT: Yup, the one thing we’ll know about the new season is that they’ve taken Rita and Katrina out of the hurricane language.
JIM: Since then, looking back however, we haven’t built a refinery, we’re not building wind turbines and we’ve done nothing with the rail system, are we committing energy suicide.
MATT: We’re certainly playing a game of Russian roulette or chicken. Now, both of those games have actually created over the years occasional suicide.
JIM: When you sit, however, and look at the way this is debated, I don’t believe the nation or many citizens understand how critical energy is to the economy, and the lifestyle we enjoy in this country from water, food production, technology to healthcare.
MATT: I’ve had the luxury of actually speaking in quite a few different places around the world over the course of the last 4 months and I would say that don’t just blame the United States for our ignorance, we’re basically just about as educated…last Thursday I spent a fabulous day at the University of Limerick in Ireland, and the question I got repeatedly asked, “why haven’t people come here and told us this story? This is shocking!” And I got the same reaction in New Zealand, and the same reaction in Aberdeen, Scotland. So we basically got 30 years of very, very low prices that got lower and lower because they never rose. So an inflation-adjusted basis really led us into dreaming that we had the right to basically get energy effectively for free and we could worry about other things. [8:12]
JIM: From my chair it almost looks, Matt, that we’re heading into a perfect energy storm. On one storm front you have supply versus demand; on the second, geopolitical issues. And then maybe a third storm front, a lack of a silver bullet, and even if there was something out there, it's the long lead time on alternatives.
MATT: Yes, and then you have all these flashpoints – the fact that the energy infrastructure is too old and it’s rusting away. Each one of these things is a separate issue.
JIM: Describe the origins of this crisis. How did we get into this predicament?
MATT: Well, if you wanted basically to go back and say when the seeds were really started: they were started when I was a kid in the '50s, and the world began believing that the Middle East had unlimited amounts of oil that we had barely just started to find, and its costs were so inexpensive that our biggest problem was basically how do we keep the world from being flooded with too much of it. So we have some sort of diversity of supply. At the same time, we're finalizing atomic energy. There was a debate going on – and this was long before I can remember about it, I’ve just gone and read about it out of curiosity – atomic energy was going to be so free that it didn’t actually warrant creating meters, the meters were way too expensive. Just give it to people for free.
So we kind of laid a foundation of an illusion that we could basically rely on effectively very expensive energy forever, and that the cornucopia of all cornucopias was in the Middle East. What amazes me is that it would appear to me now from a lot of feedback I’ve had that until I stumbled into the curiosity of finding these technical papers, and spent 2 ½ years working on what came out last June, and my book Twilight in the Desert, nobody had actually ever questioned the whole card. We just basically assumed. And so many people assumed it. It was one of those things. There’s no reason to ask how do you know that, because everybody knows it.
And then we made another egregious assumption or mistake – we created satellite TV, and out of that we let the whole world peek on how we lived. As a result China and India and Pakistan and Bolivia said, “I’d really love to live like those people in Canada and the United States do – and Europe. That really looks neat.” So we set the seeds [where] demand is going to grow forever and obviously we’ll be able to supply it because technology is making supply easier and easier to do, and we’ve always got the Middle East. And the problem is that demand was too young and supply was too old and we were giving the energy away for free. [11:03]
JIM: Something that relates to this is I believe that a lot of economists, analysts or forecasters have missed out that by the end of the 20th Century, this energy miracle that we experienced in the latter half of the 20th Century – actually throughout the 20th Century – had become globalized at that point. So now we’re dealing with emerging economic giants such as China and India – this is something that we didn’t have to deal with, let’s say in the '81 recession.
MATT: Oh heavens no. No, you’re absolutely right. And I’ll tell you what I don’t find very amusing is how many of these name-plate economists say, “well, what we all missed was China,” because I love to remind people that I wrote a white paper in the Summer of 1997 called China’s Insatiable Energy Needs, and I predicted that by 2005 that they would basically be using 6 ½ million barrels a day of oil – and that’s exactly what they were. So, all you had to do was actually go to China and have your eyes open. [11:56]
JIM: Matt, if we were looking at the energy situation in the '50s and '60s, things looked pretty bright. Then we got a wakeup call in the '70s. Then in the '80s and '90s, the pendulum swung again to the bright side. Now, I think we’re dealing with reality again, but this time I think it’s more serious.
MATT: The wake-up call we got in the '70s was a fire drill that actually created the illusion that the only thing we have to worry about is a fire in the back office. And what I mean by that is it was basically we need to be careful if these dangerous countries in the Middle East don’t artificially hold oil off the market. And as long as they don’t artificially do that, we’ll never ever have a problem. Whereas the real problem was the fact that basically in about 20 or 30 more years, their oil fields – unless they suddenly found any more – were going to be so old and they were going to go into decline. And no one ever took the time to worry about that. We actually got the classic ‘general fighting the last war.’ [12:54]
JIM: Now, in the '80s and '90s, we experienced an almost two-decade oil depression. How did this reshape the energy landscape and how did it change our thinking? I mean we went from an era of conservation to one of over consumption: cars got bigger and got less mileage; homes got bigger and were built further away from where people worked. How did that change the landscape in the sense of not only what we did economically, but maybe does that explain some of the thinking of oil company executives today?
MATT: Well, first of all, it codified several concepts in the conventional wisdom that turned out all to be wrong. The first was that we had a new suite of technology that was going to allow us to bring oil prices down lower and lower and people could be successful at it. And the technology meant that we had to drill fewer wells, so we didn’t worry about the fact that we let our drilling rigs rust away; and we didn’t worry about the fact that almost no new people came into the industry, because somehow we were going to do it through robotics, and GPS systems, and so forth. And literally there was some whacko people – there are still some whacko people – that are very prominent speakers that talk about digitized oil fields, and GPS systems and you know, satellites and so forth, and they’re just absolutely Buck Rogers – they should become Jules Verne.
And in the meantime, [for] the oil companies the technology created decline curves that were far steeper than they had ever been before because they were basically pulling the harder crumbs out of the ground at a faster and faster rate. And we didn’t find very many things of any size. And then because we were drilling fewer wells, we basically could end up very aggressively doing reserve estimations so you could kind of plug your F&D costs to your peers so you’d get the same amount of bonus. So we really went through a decade of imagining reserve additions. Had there not been this whistleblower at Shell Oil company in February 2004 who sent this big document kit to the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, we never would have had this revelation that most reserves had been made up. The whole thing turned out to be a very unfortunate two decades where we dug ourselves in a very deep hole based on just one myth after another. [15:19]
JIM: Well, you know, a lot of those myths are still with us because out of the '80s and '90s we developed some pretty strong opinions that still exist today: that demand growth would slow down, that the cost of energy would get cheaper, technology would solve the problem, and we had in reserve non-conventional energy which would become abundant and profitable.
MATT: Yup, and unfortunately non-conventional energy takes an awful lot of conventional energy used up to make it useable, so we’re turning gold into lead.
JIM: Haven’t the facts, though, disputed a lot of these assumptions and yet they still exist?
MATT: Well, you know, the problem is that there really weren’t a lot of people that really had the time and inclination to actually doggedly chase down the facts, and there were an awful lot of people that basically loved to give the same talk because they’d heard it ten times so it must be right. And what’s been going on in the last 2 to 3 years is the beginning of an enormously important debate between what are sort of euphemistically called the optimists and the pessimists. And I know most of the optimists. And I know most of the pessimists. The optimists don’t have any facts. They have some firm hunches and beliefs. And the pessimists tend to be scientists who aren’t necessarily very good communicators. People in the audience tend to want to hear good news anyway and a lot of these optimists are very humorous speakers. They make great jokes and then wise people say, “well, the real answer must be half way between.”
But I have to tell you I am very encouraged over the course of the last year by the way the media has reacted. I think the media is doing fabulous work. I think there are at least 50 times more good speakers than there were two years ago on this subject who have done their homework. I think it helped that we ended up having a seven-fold rise in oil prices to start opening people’s eyes. About 100,000 people have read my book, which I think has opened some eyes. I’ve had so many people compliment me that I’m really humbled by it, saying, “you know, whether you’re totally right or slightly off, at least we’ll never again just merrily assume that the Middle East had unlimited amounts of oil.” [17:38]
JIM: The thing that sometimes surprises me when you turn on some of the financial stations you will hear an anchor saying, “how long will these prices persist?” And it’s almost a belief that maybe the high prices and the spikes that we’ve seen especially recently, are somewhat of an aberration. Remember after Katrina when they spiked at '70, they went down the next couple of months. And every time we seem to have these spikes, they always retreat. So everybody says, “Aha, this is what will happen again.”
MATT: Yup, and the oil bears, which there’s still herds of, come out and say, “OK, I told you so.” So that’s why I’m encouraged by the amount of increase in the dialog – I’m really discouraged that we actually haven’t had anything close to a listening to the alarm ringing, let alone a wake-up call.
JIM: Well given where we are today then what are the real questions we should be asking today, versus where the focus is?
MATT: We should be asking ourselves is it wise to ignore the reality of peak oil until it’s too late to fix it? Then we should ask ourselves if we recognize the problem is either here or approaching the front door, how quickly can we basically work out some sort of a global cooperation agreement so that we really significantly change the consumption of how we use oil in the transportation markets, so we don’t end up having a really awful tipping point. Now, those are the questions we ought to be asking ourselves. [19:11]
JIM: Yet, I get the IEA book every single year, and if you take a look at the government, the EIA [or the International Energy Agency], they all assume that the energy supply will be there to meet future demand.
MATT: I know. They have accidentally become cheer leaders for peace in our time. I’ve gotten to know quite a few of these people, and sadly enough I think they actually believe what they say. I think it would maybe I guess a little bit more comforting if they know that that’s not right, but they are just paid to say that. [19:42]
JIM: You know what’ll happen, and this happens with the optimist camp, they will cite these numbers of where future demand is going to be, and future supply is going to be there as well. And somebody with that kind of authority, you know to somebody that may not be familiar with all of this, that is almost very soothing.
MATT: It’s very soothing. But again, I have to say that I might be hallucinating, but I’m winning the PR war right now.
JIM: Well, you know, the one great thing I would say is [with] books like yours – Twilight in the Desert, which is an eye-opener and if our listeners have not read this book I highly recommend you pick up a copy – there are a plethora of voices however that [say] peak oil is a distant issue, and we’ve seen them on television this week.
MATT: I know all of them, but they’ll probably actually argue that until we go over Niagara Falls. But on the other hand, you know, there are precedents of this. If you go back and look at the history of…what’s really amazing is the weekend before Pearl Harbor, World War II was basically 25% over, and there were still people passionately saying the United States will never be at war, because they didn’t want the United States to be at war, it was inconvenient.
JIM: Just as peak oil.
MATT: Yes.
JIM: But what are executives thinking? I mean, I saw the January automobile shows. I’ve seen General Motors talk about a new lineup of SUVs, and the irony of the recent spike in gas prices they were – I think it was CNBC – interviewing some consumers and here’s a guy putting gas into his SUV and he’s upset about the price.
MATT: Yes, but you know, you’ve got to remember that sticker shock is totally different than prices really being high. And it was so interesting to come back from this trip to Italy and Ireland and see that they’re basically paying close to $7 a US gallon. And they’re kind of annoyed, as we are, because they would think it ought to be $4, which it was a couple of years ago.
But again, I continue to always convert it – because it is just so easy to – back into a cup, because if you go and order coffee, tea or wine or water, you basically buy it by the cup, and when you’re paying $3.20 a gallon in the United States is 20 cents a cup. And 45 cents of the $3.20 is taxes. Can you name me anything you can buy for 20 cents a cup anymore, other than gasoline?
JIM: Nothing.
MATT: And then when you say $75 a barrel – 11 cents a cup – refiners are the only purchasers in the world that can still buy valuable things at 11 cents a cup. I was asked in Ireland, “what do you think oil should sell for?”
“Well,” I said, “for the things that you think are dear. What do you pay for Irish whiskey?” I think basically the answer is on a per barrel basis about $4,000 a barrel.
JIM: If you look at it a six-pack of Coke, it is actually more expensive than if we were to take equivalent of gasoline.
MATT: Yes, a cup of gasoline sounds so trivial, but the reality is if you have access to a passenger car, you can basically get six people in it, some stuff in the trunk, and go two miles for 20 cents. Have you ever tried to negotiate with a guy on a donkey and a cart: “will you take me and my five friends 2 miles for 20 cents.” That guy’s going to swear at you for being stupid.
JIM: Well, why don’t you give us a run down on some of the cold hard facts, and this is something I really want to get to, and you do a good job of this in Twilight, regarding reserve additions and production profiles of the major producing countries because one statistics you will hear the optimists throw out continuously, “well, we have 175 billion barrels in the Canadian tar sands.”
MATT: Yup, it’s too bad we even have reserve data, because it’s so meaningless, and it’s so unreliable, and it doesn’t tell you anything about how much a country or company can produce in the next 2 to 3 years. And any time you start commingling light sweet oil that can come out of a pressurized well bore – one well bore – at the rate of 40,000 barrels a day, or 10,000 barrels a day with heavy oil from Canada [where] it costs you $10 billion per 100,000 barrel a day production, you’re really commingling Maseratis with jalopies, and some are saying, “I have a thousand vehicles.” It’s used all the time by the optimists and they don’t have any idea what they’re talking about.
What’s really also interesting is how little data we have of any quality about how much we have left of high quality sweet oil. And the answer is most of the key crude grades are basically now very tiny in their volumes. What we’ve made it up with is basically a lesser rating quality of crude that has a higher degree of sour properties in them, and poisonous gases and is also heavier. And what we’re doing in the heavy oil is chewing through natural gas primarily as a heat source and potable water too often to create steam to melt it into basically low quality crude. And that’s where I say, “Gentlemen, we have just turned gold into lead.” [25:07]
JIM: You know it was interesting after our interview last August, and having read your book and talking about the very likelihood of peak oil being upon our front door, we saw last year that Kuwait’s Burgan field, and Mexico’s Cantarell field peaking. Aren’t these examples of the first canaries starting to sing?
MATT: The day that the Chairman of Kuwait Petroleum Corporation announced that the great Burgan complex is exhausted that’s six decades of 2 million barrels a day, I said, “that’s the first canary in the mine shaft starting to sing.” Cantarell, that’s a very serious issue for the United States. Because if Cantarell has finished, wrapped up, over its tertiary recovery program, we don’t have a term in the oil for ‘quadrutiary’ recovery. So, it’s over. And if that actually falls to anywhere nearly as low as 500,000 barrels a day by 2009, Mexico will not be exporting oil to the United States, and that puts Hugo Chavez in an unbelievably powerful catbird seat to dictate terms to us as to the conditions under which he will sell us his heavy oil. [26:21]
JIM: The frightening thing about all of this - and you’ve used several analogies about our energy gauges are broken, despite being the largest industry in the world – the energy industry – it lacks transparency, something you have argued for a long time. But most people would be surprised to learn that most petroleum stocks are mostly computer guesses.
MATT: Yes – petroleum ‘stocks’ being inventory versus equities. We don’t have a fuel gauge that basically says, “oh, we’re almost empty.”
JIM: That’s kind of scary. Let’s say if you’ve got your buddies, you have 5 or 6 people in the car and you’re going across the Arizona desert and you have no idea what your fuel gauge is saying.
MATT: Yes, it’s interesting. At various times when I’ve been speaking at fairly large groups I ask a question, “is there anybody in the audience that’s run out of gas, please raise your hand.” It’s amazing but about 75-80% of the people in the audience always raise their hand. Almost everyone has had the indignity of sooner or later forgetting to look at the gas gauge and running out of gas. And you can be driving 75 miles an hour and one second later your car stops. We have gauges, but we forget to look at them. Here we don’t have a gauge. [27:31]
JIM: That’s a real problem if you take a look at any forecast for economic growth whether you’re talking about China, India, the United States, Europe, it’s all based on increased energy consumption. So if you’re talking about everything that we need for the necessities of life whether it’s growing food or getting basic goods to the stores that all requires energy. What happens when that energy isn’t there, or you can’t get enough of what you need?
MATT: Well, what happens is basically what we need disappears. See, that’s the irony. We’ll never run out of oil but we can easily run out of food on the shelves, and cars on the street, and it doesn’t mean we’ve run out of oil. It just means that we have no more useable oil in the system. When you run out of gas in a car, it doesn’t mean there’s no gasoline left. It’s just you don’t have any gasoline in your tank. [28:24]
JIM: Do you think, given these circumstances – I mean if you take a look at energy being on the front pages, the President mentioned it in his State of the Union message and he gave a major speech today – is this a growing recognition by Washington and the politicians that this is a serious issue that’s not going away?
MATT: I certainly think it is. I think history will actually remember President Bush’s State of the Union [where he] mentioned that it is time for America to end our addiction to oil, as one of the really major turning points in the thinking process of the United States of America. I’m not saying that from a partisan standpoint. I’d say the same thing if that had been said by President Clinton. [29:07]
JIM: I want to move on to something that is very difficult to assess or even predict, and that’s an aspect of energy which is geopolitics. I can think of several flashpoints – Middle East, Nigeria, Venezuela, the Straits of Malacca – just how vulnerable are we to a sudden supply disruption?
MATT: If we had 5 or 6 or 10 million barrels a day of spare shut-in capacity, the answer is not really, not very vulnerable. But the fact that we don’t have any spare capacity [makes us vulnerable]. Now the Straits of Malacca shutting down is a showstopper. That’s 11 million barrels a day of oil flows that basically allows oil to go from the Middle East and Africa into the Eastern Asian markets. If MEND [is successful], which is the movement to emancipate the Nigerian Delta, they’ve already shut in 650,000 barrels a day of Nigerian oil, and they’re going for all of Exxon’s next. They’ve publicly announced that. Shutting 2 million barrels a day of Nigerian oil that’s really high quality, light oil and it’s a very short distance by tanker from the Niger Delta to the Gulf of Mexico, so that’s another enormous vulnerability. If Mr. Chavez realizes that Cantarell really is now in decline and he announces, “I just don’t quite like the rich people in the United States. I’m willing to supply the US with oil, but only if they can certify that they’ve given it to the poor.” He’d become so popular throughout Latin America you couldn’t believe it. These aren’t all kind of Stephen King novel events. [30:43]
JIM: I’m never surprised when I turn on the TV. In fact I was reading – trying to think of the gentleman’s book on oil – and he was talking about in the chapter an attack on the Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq, and the next morning I get up and I turn on the TV and there it is on the news.
MATT: It’s a very vulnerable facility. And what’s interesting is the good news is they killed the people in the cars, but two of the security guards also got killed. And the fact that they apparently breached the first gate was interesting.
JIM: Each kind of event it seems like they’re getting closer and closer.
MATT: Again, let me tell you an event that would be not terribly difficult for some whacko person to pull off, take a pick up truck and fill it with the same sort of energy that the guys did in Oklahoma City, and park it under the Alyeska pipeline. We have so many fragile choke points today that any of them now matter because we don’t have any spare capacity. [31:48]
JIM: Well, given this, how would you describe where we are today in terms of peak oil and gas? Is it approaching the front door, knocking at the world’s door, or is it now inside the house?
MATT: I think now the more I’ve had a lot of time to get educated about this issue, the closer you get to approaching this is the highest we can produce, the more dangerous it is to produce at that rate. And the safest thing to do is lower your rate of production so you actually don’t have a precipitous decline on the other side. On that standard, I would basically say that peak oil is now inside the front room. And peak natural gas is right behind it and is far more serious and will decline faster than oil because gas is a vapor. [32:32]
JIM: Don’t we have a problem of what remains is in stranded areas? In other words, the United States has gotten a lot of its gas through pipelines from the Gulf of Mexico through imports from Canada. But if we were to continue, we would need to liquefy it, put it in a special ship, and create a special loading dock to receive it (or LNG terminals) and we don’t have enough of them.
MATT: Well, most of the stranded gas we have in the world is of the same quality as the almost unlimited amounts of oil in the Middle East – it’s an illusion. It has not yet been discovered, and we should basically not be calling undiscovered gas a usable energy source. You can call it a theoretical energy source, but until you actually drill wells and drill a lot of appraisal wells and then core the wells so you know what the rock properties are, you have no earthly idea of whether you have usable energy or not.
JIM: And yet here in Southern California we’re building an LNG terminal south of us at the border which is the only place you can build them in California.
MATT: It’s a field of dreams: build me a stadium and the team will be there.
JIM: I want to come back to your book Twilight in the Desert where you talk about a lot of the larger producers have all peaked, recent evidence with Mexico and Cantarell, even Kuwait with Burgan. In your research in Twilight you’re talking about this approaching peak, it seems like everybody – whether you’re looking at the EIA or the IEA – looks towards Saudi Arabia, and yet I don’t know maybe they believe this themselves that they’re going out and say, “well, we’re going to invest this much, and we’re going to take our production up to a certain level,” but I get from reading Twilight you doubt if that’s possible.
MATT: Well, first of all, it is not possible. I’ve had the luxury now of an enormous amount of feedback, including some really senior people within Saudi Aramco that have had the guts to say, “I really love reading your book, you accurately described the unbelievable challenges we’re dealing with.” I think part of the problem that some people there have is they’ve heard for so many years through our experts that they can produce 25 million barrels a day, that they say, “Pssht, sure we can, everybody has told us that.” [34:47]
JIM: Whether they can do that and taking a look at their difficulties, but these are some serious assumptions I think that…
MATT: There are some unbelievable assumptions. When you have gentlemen like Dr. Sadad al-Husseini who has his PhD from Brown University, and he was Executive Vice-President of Saudi Aramco in charge of E&P, and Dr al-Husseini and I have been on two programs together in England, and he’s been quoted in the English papers as saying the West is deluded to rely on Saudi oil. He’s basically said, “over 12 million barrels a day, it just isn’t in the cards.” And he was known in the '90s as the brains of Saudi Aramco, and he’s a fabulous human being. [35:30]
JIM: Let’s go to the optimists’ arguments for a minute and just show how serious this is. I wonder Matt if you would give us a quick rundown of the alternatives: tar sands; nuclear power; wind; solar; clean coal; and biofuels – which are in the headlines.
MATT: The first thing that the optimists rely on is that we always have had reserve appreciation, and so fields over time always get bigger. That happened 50 years ago. There’s not a scrap of data to support that concept for the last 25 years. It’s just wrong. The second concept is embrace technology. All you have to do is be a believer in technology. I continue to remind people that all the oil field technology we’re talking about was being invented in the early '70s when our firm started business. It took a decade to invent it, it took a decade to commercialize it, and it took 15 years to spread it around the world and the blackboard’s bare. There is no more technology of any significance that anybody is working on. So then you get into: look at all the unconventional oil we have that is now commercial. You can make money – if you’ve already paid for your facility and written it off – on oil sands, but oil sands are very different from tar sands. The oil sands can be strip mined and they’re still extremely energy intensive, but tar sands need to have these deep mine shafts of steam put in to melt the [tar] – it’s really basically bitumen, a recycle of La Brea tar pits – you chew up such an intensive amount of energy. And what they’re talking about is undiscovered natural gas in Northern Alberta, and potable river water from the Athabasca River, that to use either one as a steam source to create low quality oil is a crime.
And then they basically talk about – assume – all this stuff we’re basically going to discover, and I say, “you know, give me a break, Cantarell in Mexico was discovered in 1975 and 1976, that’s the last giant oil field we’ve ever found. Prudhoe Bay, the North Sea, and Western Siberia were all discovered in 1968, and that’s the last time we found a large or medium onshore oil field in the Middle East.” 1968 was a long time ago. [37:44]
JIM: What about, for example, Mexico announcing that they discovered a giant oil field, though we don’t know much about it.
MATT: They don’t know much about it because there’s been one well drilled and they haven’t yet cored it. You see until you core a well -- which is really basically a very technically tricky process of going down to the level of the earth where you think the oil rocks are productive, and literally cutting a core, and retrieving it and sending it to a laboratory, and saying let’s test the porosity, let’s test the permeability, you don’t know anything about the reservoir rocks and whether they will flow oil or not. Until you flow test the oil, you know nothing about whether it’s highly free flowing or very, very syrupy molasses. So, drilling a well is an important first step, but until you well test and core, you’re basically just guessing. [38:44]
JIM: What about biofuels?
MATT: There are probably some biofuels that are really good potential solutions, but any biofuel that has to be planted every year is by definition taking a lot of nutrients out of the soil. Unless you’re using very, very cheap labor, you’re using a lot of energy in your tractors and a lot of energy in your fertilizer. Now take sugarcane-based ethanol in Brazil for instance. They basically don’t uproot the cane. They have cheap labor with machetes that hack it, so that’s actually pretty energy-intensive. The work that’s being done on switch grass, which is this fabulous grass we sort of plowed up in most parts of the Midwest that covered the Great Plains and at one time fed 100 million buffalo, as long as you’re not grazing it with buffalo, it grows between 6 and 8 feet in the peak of the season. You cut it with hay machinery, so it regrows the next spring. There’s a lot of promise in those types of fuels. But what we’re doing is we’re promoting things basically for the sake of subsidies and being callously ignorant of the energy intensity. What we can’t afford the luxury of is creating a whole new suite of energy products that are net energy losers. [39:55]
JIM: How would you describe corn ethanol?
MATT: Net energy loser – big time.
JIM: And yet that’s what we just passed and that’s the direction we seem to be going in.
MATT: Yes, and the corn lobby is a very powerful lobby. They love the subsidy, but I think it’s time to kind of get off that stuff.
JIM: Given where we are and what you know, what should we be doing now?
MATT: Getting as educated as can be on how serious these issues are. Getting as educated as can be on how inexpensive energy still is. Start thinking through all the ways we can rapidly reduce the intensity of how we use oil and gas, so that we make sure we don’t basically waste it unnecessarily. Go on an R&D program the likes of which we’ve never done to create some new forms of energy. But I think that won’t happen soon enough.
So we really have to adopt a big conservation plan: liberating people to work wherever they want to, and when they want to, and pay by productivity, could be one of the really great sort of social revolution things that we do in the next 5 years and basically eliminate all the people in places like California and Texas, for instance, who are spending upwards of 4 hours a day crawling to work in traffic and crawling home so they’re mad when they get to work, and they’re mad when they get home, and they were mad when oil was free. Eliminating our kind of compulsive obsession with having exotic food from all around the world in our supermarkets every place 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year – it’s too energy intensive. Growing stuff at home and canning it. And what we really need to do is ultimately reverse this concept of globalization and go back to actually living in what are euphemistically called villages close to where we work, which can be downtown, but it’s just not 3 hours commute. [41:42]
JIM: What about the rail system?
MATT: The rail system needs to be totally overhauled and totally rebuilt, and use the rail system to ship goods and people but in shipping goods only do it as far as you can ship goods to water, and then get goods on marine based transportation, barges or vessels, and use our water system as the way we basically deliver goods as close to where the kind of end point is – sort of like Federal Express does. And we can actually do all of this stuff. I mean if we applied this on a global basis with the same intensity as we had to build the war machine for World War II, we could get this done in 5 to 7 years. [42:24]
JIM: Do you think it’s going to take a crisis to launch that?
MATT: Sure it is. Go back again to where we started. If Katrina and Rita weren’t even looked at as they were flashing yellow lights, it’s going to take a crisis.
JIM: That’s what I fear, Matt. I fear we’re heading into this perfect energy storm because it’s like we’re sitting on the shore, and the sky looks blue, the winds are picking up but about 10 to 15 miles offshore, beyond sight, there’s a hurricane.
MATT: At least there are a lot more people in serious places that are starting to think through than there were about by a huge measure a year ago. But to galvanize the whole system, I think we’re going to have to have some form of an energy 9/11.
JIM: Any final thoughts for our listeners? Let’s say if there’s some skeptics in the crowd because you know we hear stories about abiotic oil, and there’s just a naturally gooey center in the middle of the Earth that replenishes every well in the world, I can’t help but think in terms of that argument that if you were ExxonMobil sitting on that cash that if there was a gooey spot in the earth somewhere, you would be going after it.
MATT: If the abiotic oil theory worked, why didn’t it ever refill any of our depleted oil fields? I think that we have basically created a fool’s paradise, and it’s really time for the fools to wake up and get real because this is actually something that could really destroy our lives, and not our kids’ lives, but our lives. But it doesn’t have to happen that way. [43:53]
JIM: It goes back to something you said mid-way in our conversation: it’s not at the front door, it’s inside the house. Matt, your book Twilight in the Desert did a lot to open people’s eyes. When’s it coming out in paperback?
MATT: In about a month, and also exciting for me is in about 2 months, it comes out in Chinese.
JIM: And the 100,000 copies that have sold globally, which is incredible, what are the sales overseas, has it been as popular there?
MATT: I don’t really know, all I can tell you is on Friday afternoon and I went into my favorite bookstore in London Hatchards, and I couldn’t believe as I walked up the stairs to see a ‘hot items’ [list] with Twilight in the Desert at the top, so I introduced myself to the guy at the desk, and he said, “come up stairs and sign the ten copies we have on the shelves,” and we got there and they were gone, and he’d just filled the shelves up on Thursday afternoon. He said, “we’re having people come in and buy this book five at a time. I can’t believe you wrote it.” You know, for a book that came out in the middle of last June, it’s pretty good news to me. Wiley has decided they’re going to continue publishing the hardback even though usually when the paperback comes out publishers sort of wind up the printing effort on the hardback. [45:06]
JIM: All I can say to my listeners is if you want to get educated, Matt’s book is certainly one of the top of the list because it opens up your eyes whenever you hear about oil being bountiful in the Middle East. Matt, I know you’re a busy person and you have to get off, but I want to thank you as always for giving us a good deal of your time and joining us on the Financial Sense Newshour.
MATT: Well, thank you for the opportunity for being on your program. I enjoyed the conversation last Fall, and I enjoyed it again today.
JIM: Alright, and all the best to you Sir, and may you sell another 100,000 copies.
An Alert Unlike Any Other
A nuclear waste vault in New Mexico will long outlive our society. Experts are working on elaborate ways to warn future civilizations.
By Charles Piller, Times Staff Writer
May 3, 2006
CARLSBAD, N.M. — Roger Nelson has a simple and unequivocal message for the people of the year 12006: Don't dig here.
As chief scientist of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Nelson oversees a cavernous salt mine that is the first geological lockbox for the "fiendishly toxic" detritus of nuclear weapons production: chemical sludge, lab gear and filters laced with tons of radioactive plutonium.
Nearly half a mile underground, workers push waste drums into crystalline labyrinths that seem as remote as the moon. A faint salty haze glows in powdery beams from miners' headlamps and settles on the lips like a desert kiss. Computer projections predict that within 1,000 years the ceilings and walls will collapse in a crushing embrace that seals the plutonium in place.
But plutonium remains deadly for 250 times that long — an unsettling reminder that some of today's hazards will outlast the civilizations that created them. The "forever problem," unique to the modern technological age, has made crafting the user manual for this toxic tomb the final daunting task in an already monumental project. The result is a gargantuan system that borrows elements equally from Stonehenge and "Star Trek."
Communicating danger may seem relatively straightforward, but countless human efforts to bridge the ages have failed as societies fall, languages die and words once poetic or portentous become the indecipherable marks of a long-forgotten scribbler.
To future generations, warnings about Nelson's dump may seem as impenetrable as the 600-year-old "Canterbury Tales" are for all but a few scholars today.
"No culture has ever tried, self-consciously and scientifically, to design a symbol that would last 10,000 years and still be intelligible," said David B. Givens, an anthropologist who helped plan the nuclear-site warnings. "And even if we succeed, would the message be believed?"
The Energy Department predicted such a problem when it began planning for the $9-billion waste dump, dubbed WIPP, in 1974 and for a similar repository in Nevada at Yucca Mountain, near Las Vegas. That site has not yet been opened. Eventually it will store highly radioactive spent fuel from nuclear power plants as well as high-level waste from the weapons program.
Trying to communicate across 500 generations posed an unprecedented challenge of linguistics, semiotics and materials science, so the government first asked scientists, futurists and historians to envision what the far-distant future might be like.
Their report combines dry analysis and projections worthy of sci-fi disaster films, including massive climate change and feminist corporations that disbelieve WIPP warnings because they were written by men. Civilization is so interdependent and fragile, one panelist grimly noted, "that any massive global catastrophe might lead to reversion to at least a preindustrial era." Greed or desperation could give rise to legends that WIPP holds buried treasure — apparently confirmed by surface warnings to keep out.
In a sense, they're right. Oil and gas deposits lie thousands of feet below the plant. In 100 or 5,000 years, an energy-poor government, company or gasoline-addicted tribe in a ruined society, like those depicted in the film "The Road Warrior," could adopt a "drill first, ask questions later" policy — piercing the repository and pulling death to the surface.
Others predicted the invention of self-guided robotic "mole miners" that would penetrate the site from the side or below. In a scenario set in the year 11991, robotic slaves are infected with a computer virus that compels them to override their safety programming as they compulsively drill and construct mine shafts.
Opportunities for WIPP to fail, the experts agreed, are limited only by the imagination.
The government formed a separate panel of scientists, linguists and artists to create a warning scheme to counter the pessimistic projections. That group immediately rejected digital or paper records — only a solution cast in stone could hope to solve a problem for the ages.
If Egyptian pyramids have lasted more than 5,000 years, today's monuments should fare better — if built from prosaic materials, such as ultra-hard concrete. Scavengers stripped the pyramids bare for their once-shimmering marble skins.
The trefoil symbol for radioactive material might seem a natural alternative to text, but experts doubt that it will be understood by future societies any better than today's English. Consider the swastika, first used on pottery by European tribes in 4000 BC. It was adopted by ancient Troy and later became a holy icon of Hinduism. When the Nazis claimed it, the symbol became widely reviled.
The panelists also considered the plaque on the 1972 Pioneer space probe, now headed for deep space. It pictures a nude man and woman, a schematic drawing of the craft escaping our solar system and a basic interstellar map. They soon rejected it as a model, said Jon Lomberg, an artist who designed the plaque with the late astronomer Carl Sagan.
"You'd think it would be easier to communicate with humans" than extraterrestrials, he said. "But the [Pioneer] spacecraft will never land, so it's only going to be found by some highly developed technological culture. All we can guess about the future inhabitants of the area near WIPP is that they are human — unless they are cyborgs…. Once you have people with augmented brains or genetically engineered minds with enhanced perceptions, you can't be sure how human they will be."
There are at least two universally understood pictographic forms. The human stick figure has survived nearly unchanged from Stone Age cave drawings to the doors of modern public restrooms. And the sequential panel, or comic strip, was developed independently by ancient Egyptians, American Indians and medieval Japanese.
They also are far from foolproof. The South Africa Chamber of Mines learned this when it used a simple picture sequence to train illiterate miners to clear rocks from mine tracks. Instead of improving, the rock problem worsened.
"Miners were indeed reading the message, but from right to left," said Lomberg, a former WIPP advisor. "They obligingly dumped their rocks on the tracks."
Nelson considers such concerns far-fetched, citing 30,000-year-old cave drawings.
"I understand those cave drawings and I don't speak Neanderthal…. He's killing a bison, 'bison — food!' I can do pictographs just as well," he said. "I can convey an absolute sense of danger."
Yet the same Stone Age caves contain markings and handprints whose meaning remains obscure.
"The scribbles, we have no idea what they are…. The handprints — is that the artist's signature?" Lomberg said. "We don't know. Of course the big difference is that these were not intended as messages to the future — so far as we can tell."
With so many ways to fail, WIPP's planners opted for the classic American approach: Think big and leave no stone unturned. The plan will take more than a century to implement.
To grasp the scale of the warnings, start with the Great Pyramid in Egypt, built from more than 6.5 million tons of stone covering 13 acres. Multiply that mass by five, and you have the first warning layer: a 98-foot-wide, 33-foot-tall, 2-mile-long berm surrounding the site. That's just to get the attention of anyone who happens by.
"Size equates with importance. The bigger the animal the more that animal is to be reckoned with," Givens said.
Powerful magnets and radar reflectors would be buried inside the berm so that remote sensors could recognize the site as purposefully and elaborately designed.
It would be surrounded by 48 granite or concrete markers, 32 outside the berm and 16 inside, each 25 feet high and weighing 105 tons, engraved with warnings in English, Spanish, Russian, French, Chinese, Arabic and Navajo, with room for future discoverers to add warnings in contemporary languages. Pictures would denote buried hazards and human faces of horror and revulsion.
The same symbols would be printed on metal, plastic and ceramic disks with abrasion-resistant coatings, 9 inches in diameter, that would be buried just below the surface.
Three information rooms would archive detailed drawings of WIPP's chambers and the physics of its hazards on stone tablets. They would also provide a world map showing all other known waste repositories and a star chart to calculate the year the site was sealed.
One such room would stand in the center of the site. Another would be buried inside the berm, its only entrance a 2-foot hole to inhibit theft of the tablets, sealed with a 1,600-pound stone plug. The third room would be off site — perhaps inside the nearby Carlsbad Caverns.
The final thing WIPP needs is a kind of Rosetta stone, a pictorial dictionary to aid in translation.
The markers will take decades to build and test, to help ensure they stand the test of time. But there's no hurry. WIPP won't be full until 2033. It would then be guarded by the Energy Department for 100 years until it is abandoned; no one who designed the markers would be alive to see them succeed for even a single day.
Inspired by so long a view, one of the site's expert panels, in an epigraph to its report, quoted Rabbi Tarfon, a Jewish sage who lived 1,900 years ago:
"You are not obliged to finish the task, nor are you released from undertaking it."
Once the vault is locked, some of WIPP's advisors want the site left unmarked because any warnings would draw only more attention, they say. Warnings, they argue, would be misunderstood or dismissed, the same way ancient grave robbers ignored curses inscribed on the tombs of Egyptian pharaohs to seize the riches inside.
Leave it bare, they contend, and the site will melt unseen into the harsh New Mexico desert.
"Any monument would become a tourist attraction," said Gregory Benford, a UC Irvine physicist and former WIPP advisor. "People come; they need hotels. Hotels need water. They drill for water and break into the vault. 'No marker' is a strategy, but people regard it as immoral."
Such views reflect WIPP's one certainty: No one knows what will happen far in the future.
"I have to assume that the divine creator is going to take care of most of this stuff," said Steve Casey, the WIPP engineer charged with overseeing construction of the warning system. "No matter what confounded thing we come up with, all it takes is one catastrophic event and it's gone."
That so much time and effort are spent even thinking about how to warn future generations reflects a significant shift in nuclear attitudes. The past still can be glimpsed a short drive from WIPP at a site where an atomic warhead was detonated 1,151 feet underground in 1961.
Two corroded plaques glued to a 4-foot concrete slab commemorate the test, dubbed Project Gnome. The monument has been nudged several yards over the decades by cattle that use it as a rubbing post. Spent rifle shells crunch underfoot; the pockmarked shrine is favored by locals for target practice.
A third plaque was pried off, perhaps as a souvenir. According to earlier visitors, it read, in plain English, "This site will remain dangerous for 24,000 years."
A nuclear waste vault in New Mexico will long outlive our society. Experts are working on elaborate ways to warn future civilizations.
By Charles Piller, Times Staff Writer
May 3, 2006
CARLSBAD, N.M. — Roger Nelson has a simple and unequivocal message for the people of the year 12006: Don't dig here.
As chief scientist of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Nelson oversees a cavernous salt mine that is the first geological lockbox for the "fiendishly toxic" detritus of nuclear weapons production: chemical sludge, lab gear and filters laced with tons of radioactive plutonium.
Nearly half a mile underground, workers push waste drums into crystalline labyrinths that seem as remote as the moon. A faint salty haze glows in powdery beams from miners' headlamps and settles on the lips like a desert kiss. Computer projections predict that within 1,000 years the ceilings and walls will collapse in a crushing embrace that seals the plutonium in place.
But plutonium remains deadly for 250 times that long — an unsettling reminder that some of today's hazards will outlast the civilizations that created them. The "forever problem," unique to the modern technological age, has made crafting the user manual for this toxic tomb the final daunting task in an already monumental project. The result is a gargantuan system that borrows elements equally from Stonehenge and "Star Trek."
Communicating danger may seem relatively straightforward, but countless human efforts to bridge the ages have failed as societies fall, languages die and words once poetic or portentous become the indecipherable marks of a long-forgotten scribbler.
To future generations, warnings about Nelson's dump may seem as impenetrable as the 600-year-old "Canterbury Tales" are for all but a few scholars today.
"No culture has ever tried, self-consciously and scientifically, to design a symbol that would last 10,000 years and still be intelligible," said David B. Givens, an anthropologist who helped plan the nuclear-site warnings. "And even if we succeed, would the message be believed?"
The Energy Department predicted such a problem when it began planning for the $9-billion waste dump, dubbed WIPP, in 1974 and for a similar repository in Nevada at Yucca Mountain, near Las Vegas. That site has not yet been opened. Eventually it will store highly radioactive spent fuel from nuclear power plants as well as high-level waste from the weapons program.
Trying to communicate across 500 generations posed an unprecedented challenge of linguistics, semiotics and materials science, so the government first asked scientists, futurists and historians to envision what the far-distant future might be like.
Their report combines dry analysis and projections worthy of sci-fi disaster films, including massive climate change and feminist corporations that disbelieve WIPP warnings because they were written by men. Civilization is so interdependent and fragile, one panelist grimly noted, "that any massive global catastrophe might lead to reversion to at least a preindustrial era." Greed or desperation could give rise to legends that WIPP holds buried treasure — apparently confirmed by surface warnings to keep out.
In a sense, they're right. Oil and gas deposits lie thousands of feet below the plant. In 100 or 5,000 years, an energy-poor government, company or gasoline-addicted tribe in a ruined society, like those depicted in the film "The Road Warrior," could adopt a "drill first, ask questions later" policy — piercing the repository and pulling death to the surface.
Others predicted the invention of self-guided robotic "mole miners" that would penetrate the site from the side or below. In a scenario set in the year 11991, robotic slaves are infected with a computer virus that compels them to override their safety programming as they compulsively drill and construct mine shafts.
Opportunities for WIPP to fail, the experts agreed, are limited only by the imagination.
The government formed a separate panel of scientists, linguists and artists to create a warning scheme to counter the pessimistic projections. That group immediately rejected digital or paper records — only a solution cast in stone could hope to solve a problem for the ages.
If Egyptian pyramids have lasted more than 5,000 years, today's monuments should fare better — if built from prosaic materials, such as ultra-hard concrete. Scavengers stripped the pyramids bare for their once-shimmering marble skins.
The trefoil symbol for radioactive material might seem a natural alternative to text, but experts doubt that it will be understood by future societies any better than today's English. Consider the swastika, first used on pottery by European tribes in 4000 BC. It was adopted by ancient Troy and later became a holy icon of Hinduism. When the Nazis claimed it, the symbol became widely reviled.
The panelists also considered the plaque on the 1972 Pioneer space probe, now headed for deep space. It pictures a nude man and woman, a schematic drawing of the craft escaping our solar system and a basic interstellar map. They soon rejected it as a model, said Jon Lomberg, an artist who designed the plaque with the late astronomer Carl Sagan.
"You'd think it would be easier to communicate with humans" than extraterrestrials, he said. "But the [Pioneer] spacecraft will never land, so it's only going to be found by some highly developed technological culture. All we can guess about the future inhabitants of the area near WIPP is that they are human — unless they are cyborgs…. Once you have people with augmented brains or genetically engineered minds with enhanced perceptions, you can't be sure how human they will be."
There are at least two universally understood pictographic forms. The human stick figure has survived nearly unchanged from Stone Age cave drawings to the doors of modern public restrooms. And the sequential panel, or comic strip, was developed independently by ancient Egyptians, American Indians and medieval Japanese.
They also are far from foolproof. The South Africa Chamber of Mines learned this when it used a simple picture sequence to train illiterate miners to clear rocks from mine tracks. Instead of improving, the rock problem worsened.
"Miners were indeed reading the message, but from right to left," said Lomberg, a former WIPP advisor. "They obligingly dumped their rocks on the tracks."
Nelson considers such concerns far-fetched, citing 30,000-year-old cave drawings.
"I understand those cave drawings and I don't speak Neanderthal…. He's killing a bison, 'bison — food!' I can do pictographs just as well," he said. "I can convey an absolute sense of danger."
Yet the same Stone Age caves contain markings and handprints whose meaning remains obscure.
"The scribbles, we have no idea what they are…. The handprints — is that the artist's signature?" Lomberg said. "We don't know. Of course the big difference is that these were not intended as messages to the future — so far as we can tell."
With so many ways to fail, WIPP's planners opted for the classic American approach: Think big and leave no stone unturned. The plan will take more than a century to implement.
To grasp the scale of the warnings, start with the Great Pyramid in Egypt, built from more than 6.5 million tons of stone covering 13 acres. Multiply that mass by five, and you have the first warning layer: a 98-foot-wide, 33-foot-tall, 2-mile-long berm surrounding the site. That's just to get the attention of anyone who happens by.
"Size equates with importance. The bigger the animal the more that animal is to be reckoned with," Givens said.
Powerful magnets and radar reflectors would be buried inside the berm so that remote sensors could recognize the site as purposefully and elaborately designed.
It would be surrounded by 48 granite or concrete markers, 32 outside the berm and 16 inside, each 25 feet high and weighing 105 tons, engraved with warnings in English, Spanish, Russian, French, Chinese, Arabic and Navajo, with room for future discoverers to add warnings in contemporary languages. Pictures would denote buried hazards and human faces of horror and revulsion.
The same symbols would be printed on metal, plastic and ceramic disks with abrasion-resistant coatings, 9 inches in diameter, that would be buried just below the surface.
Three information rooms would archive detailed drawings of WIPP's chambers and the physics of its hazards on stone tablets. They would also provide a world map showing all other known waste repositories and a star chart to calculate the year the site was sealed.
One such room would stand in the center of the site. Another would be buried inside the berm, its only entrance a 2-foot hole to inhibit theft of the tablets, sealed with a 1,600-pound stone plug. The third room would be off site — perhaps inside the nearby Carlsbad Caverns.
The final thing WIPP needs is a kind of Rosetta stone, a pictorial dictionary to aid in translation.
The markers will take decades to build and test, to help ensure they stand the test of time. But there's no hurry. WIPP won't be full until 2033. It would then be guarded by the Energy Department for 100 years until it is abandoned; no one who designed the markers would be alive to see them succeed for even a single day.
Inspired by so long a view, one of the site's expert panels, in an epigraph to its report, quoted Rabbi Tarfon, a Jewish sage who lived 1,900 years ago:
"You are not obliged to finish the task, nor are you released from undertaking it."
Once the vault is locked, some of WIPP's advisors want the site left unmarked because any warnings would draw only more attention, they say. Warnings, they argue, would be misunderstood or dismissed, the same way ancient grave robbers ignored curses inscribed on the tombs of Egyptian pharaohs to seize the riches inside.
Leave it bare, they contend, and the site will melt unseen into the harsh New Mexico desert.
"Any monument would become a tourist attraction," said Gregory Benford, a UC Irvine physicist and former WIPP advisor. "People come; they need hotels. Hotels need water. They drill for water and break into the vault. 'No marker' is a strategy, but people regard it as immoral."
Such views reflect WIPP's one certainty: No one knows what will happen far in the future.
"I have to assume that the divine creator is going to take care of most of this stuff," said Steve Casey, the WIPP engineer charged with overseeing construction of the warning system. "No matter what confounded thing we come up with, all it takes is one catastrophic event and it's gone."
That so much time and effort are spent even thinking about how to warn future generations reflects a significant shift in nuclear attitudes. The past still can be glimpsed a short drive from WIPP at a site where an atomic warhead was detonated 1,151 feet underground in 1961.
Two corroded plaques glued to a 4-foot concrete slab commemorate the test, dubbed Project Gnome. The monument has been nudged several yards over the decades by cattle that use it as a rubbing post. Spent rifle shells crunch underfoot; the pockmarked shrine is favored by locals for target practice.
A third plaque was pried off, perhaps as a souvenir. According to earlier visitors, it read, in plain English, "This site will remain dangerous for 24,000 years."
The Energy Wars
The rise of a new global energy elite means high oil and gas prices are here to stay.
WEB-EXCLUSIVE COMMENTARY
By Michael Hirsh
Newsweek
Updated: 6:55 p.m. ET May 3, 2006
May 3, 2006 - It is a mantra of the globalization crowd. In today’s global economy, we are told, all that really matters is which country produces the best brains and skills. The world is flat, after all. The playing field is leveled. Wrong, wrong and wrong. What also matters, we are learning, is who controls the world's energy resources. Evo Morales's abrupt decision earlier this week to nationalize Bolivia's natural-gas industry was only the latest worrisome move in a long-term trend. Morales, a leftist elected president last December, was apparently influenced by a meeting he had in Havana last Saturday with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who's rocketed to international prominence by doing much the same thing to his country's oil industry. President Chavez, sitting atop his growing pile of petrodollars, has gleefully thumbed his nose at Washington’s efforts to rein him in. Similarly, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is defiantly enriching uranium and sneering at Western threats of sanctions. And he obviously thinks he can, perhaps because no one is threatening to cut off Iran's oil exports as part of the forthcoming sanctions plan.
The would-be czar of this new global energy elite is Vladimir Putin. Having spent the better part of his six years in office wresting control of his nation's vast oil and gas resources, the Russian president is now playing a brass-knuckle game of power politics. When Putin partially cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and therefore to Western Europe in the first three days of the year—mainly to bully Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko into taking a lower price—the European Union went into a state of near panic. According to the Energy Charter Secretariat in Brussels, by 2020 the Western Europeans are expected to get half their gas from Russia, which commands 28 percent of world gas reserves, more than any country in the world. Suddenly the Europeans realized there weren’t that many alternative suppliers. Putin’s Kremlin-controlled gas monopoly, Gazprom, has hired German Chancellor Angela Merkel's predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, as a consultant. Gazprom deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev admitted at an economic forum earlier this month that even Britain’s flagship utility, Centrica, should be considered a potential takeover target. "With our present financial strength, it is very difficult to find a company which is not on our watch list," he said.
What does all this geostrategic strutting have to do with soaring prices at the gas pump? For one thing, the uncertainty created by Iran, Iraq and Venezuela has added a $10-$20 risk premium to the price of oil per barrel, according to Wall Street analysts. The politics of energy also doesn't bode well for future prices, as U.S. Secretary of Energy Sam Bodman seemed to suggest last weekend when he said Americans might have to get used to paying $3-plus per gallon for gasoline.
Today, oil and gas experts around the world are growing alarmed not just at future scarcity—the idea that the world may have hit “peak oil” seems to be taking hold—but at who's in control of the precious stuff. As demand for energy explodes worldwide, there is less of it available and less exploration for it. That is partly because of a dropoff in investment created by the decline in oil prices in the '90s. But it is also because multinational corporations like ExxonMobil (despite its record profits) now own just 6 percent of supplies, versus a whopping 77 percent that's now owned by state-owned entities, according to the Petroleum Finance Corp., a Washington-based consulting group. State control guarantees less efficiency in the exploration for oil, and in the extraction and refinement of fuel. Further, these state-owned companies do not divulge how much they really own, or what the production and exploration numbers are. These have become the new state secrets.
Quietly an understanding of this power shift in the world is growing in Washington, as well. The price shock after Hurricane Katrina, especially—not to mention the plummeting poll numbers that followed for Bush—led administration officials to understand just how fragile U.S. economic security has become because of energy. Nothing quite like it has happened since the 1973 OPEC embargo. Administration sources say the Katrina effect, as well as concern over moves by Chavez, were mainly behind Bush's surprising call for an end to "America's oil addiction" in his State of the Union address last January. At the same time, U.S. officials have come to realize that there is deep anger and enmity in the Kremlin against the United States (particularly over U.S. efforts to win Ukraine and Georgia to the West), and that Putin has his own agenda. One example: even as Moscow has joined the Western effort to confront Tehran over its nuclear program, Russia and Iran are taking a unified stand in resisting a U.S. effort to build a trans-Caspian pipeline that would reroute gas out of the Russian system to Baku, Azerbaijan.
Putin has long been nursing ambitions of using Russia's vast oil and gas supplies as an instrument of power. In the mid '90s, after 15 years in the KGB, Putin went back to school, attending the St. Petersburg Mining Institute. He wrote a dissertation titled "Toward a Russian Transnational Energy Company." The topic: how to use energy resources for grand strategic planning. There is reason to believe that Putin's highly publicized confrontation with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former owner of the defunct Yukos—the last of the big private energy concerns in Russia—was about much more than wresting political power from the so-called oligarchs, former apparatchiks who gained control of Russia’s resources after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Putin is not known to be personally corrupt, or even particularly power-hungry. What he is hungry for—and indeed has been since he was elected in 2000—is a restoration of Russia's power and influence. Some observers believe that Putin's trumped-up arrest of Khodorkovsky—who will be spending the next few years in a Siberian labor camp—was mainly about taking control of the energy sector, rather than edging aside a political rival.
It is tempting to say that oil and gas have become the new strategic weapons of the 21st century. But in one crucial respect that is not true. As Putin discovered from his aborted effort to cut off Ukraine’s gas—and as even Ahmadinejad is learning—when you threaten to cut off your customers, you only cut off your own nose. You have to sell oil to someone; otherwise crude is just black muck. Where the control of energy counts is in accumulating wealth, and therefore power and influence. As former U.S. under secretary of State Marc Grossman says, "The question is what are they doing with the money."
The Bush administration may think it has one trump card in Iraq. U.S. interests obviously lie with the vast proven and potential Iraqi oil fields, said to be the world's largest. The Iraqi oil ministry has signed about 40 memorandums of understanding, many with U.S. companies, according to industry sources. Under them, the majors such as ExxonMobil, Chevron and ConocoPhillips are giving technical advice "free" to the ministry (a typical get-in-the-door strategy for the industry). Challenged at a congressional hearing in March, CENTCOM commander Gen. John Abizaid was frank in suggesting that, while oil was not the reason America went to war, it may provide a critical reason for staying. "The United States and its allies have a vital interest in the oil-rich region," Abizaid said. "Ultimately it comes down to the free flow of goods and resources on which the prosperity of our own nation and everybody else in the world depend."
But after three years of explosive anger against the U.S. occupation, it would be foolish to think that the Iraqi government, too, won’t catch the nationalist bug that’s spreading worldwide, in what appears to be an outgrowth of both antiglobalization sentiments and anti-Americanism. “I think the likelihood is high that American companies will have some significant position in Iraq,” says J. Robinson West, head of Petroleum Finance Corp. “On the other hand I think it’s highly unlikely that the petroleum sector will be dominated by American companies. We really didn't go to war over oil, and I think at this late date we don't want to make it look like we did.” ExxonMobil spokesman Russ Roberts adds, "The Iraqi oil belongs to the Iraqi people. If the Iraqi people determine that they want the help of international oil companies in developing their resources, then ExxonMobil would certainly be interested in participating."
What does it all mean? "Welcome to the age of energy insecurity," says West, a former Reagan administration official (and friend of Dick Cheney's, the man who once dismissed energy conservation as a "personal virtue"). "Worldwide production will peak. The result will be skyrocketing prices, with a huge, sustained economic shock. Jobs will be lost. Without action, the crisis will certainly bring energy rivalries, if not energy wars. Vast wealth will be shifted, probably away from the U.S. For the last 20 years, U.S. policy has discouraged production and encouraged consumption. If we dither any more, we will pay a terrible price, the economic equivalent of a Category 5 hurricane. Katrina was Category 4."
Washington appears as helpless in preparing for this crisis as it did in anticipating Hurricane Katrina. As we have seen in recent weeks, Congress is still dithering over such silly proposals as a $100 rebate to gasoline customers. But Republican leaders are balking at sponsoring proposals that could really make a difference, like a new gasoline tax that would change U.S. consumption habits and a serious increase in CAFE (corporate average fuel-economy) standards, which require automakers to meet an average mileage requirement. With the GOP facing a bitter fight for control of the Congress later this year, such measures are considered too politically painful. There could be a lot more pain for Americans down the road, however, at the hands of Putin and his energy-rich allies.
© 2006 Newsweek, Inc.
The rise of a new global energy elite means high oil and gas prices are here to stay.
WEB-EXCLUSIVE COMMENTARY
By Michael Hirsh
Newsweek
Updated: 6:55 p.m. ET May 3, 2006
May 3, 2006 - It is a mantra of the globalization crowd. In today’s global economy, we are told, all that really matters is which country produces the best brains and skills. The world is flat, after all. The playing field is leveled. Wrong, wrong and wrong. What also matters, we are learning, is who controls the world's energy resources. Evo Morales's abrupt decision earlier this week to nationalize Bolivia's natural-gas industry was only the latest worrisome move in a long-term trend. Morales, a leftist elected president last December, was apparently influenced by a meeting he had in Havana last Saturday with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who's rocketed to international prominence by doing much the same thing to his country's oil industry. President Chavez, sitting atop his growing pile of petrodollars, has gleefully thumbed his nose at Washington’s efforts to rein him in. Similarly, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is defiantly enriching uranium and sneering at Western threats of sanctions. And he obviously thinks he can, perhaps because no one is threatening to cut off Iran's oil exports as part of the forthcoming sanctions plan.
The would-be czar of this new global energy elite is Vladimir Putin. Having spent the better part of his six years in office wresting control of his nation's vast oil and gas resources, the Russian president is now playing a brass-knuckle game of power politics. When Putin partially cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and therefore to Western Europe in the first three days of the year—mainly to bully Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko into taking a lower price—the European Union went into a state of near panic. According to the Energy Charter Secretariat in Brussels, by 2020 the Western Europeans are expected to get half their gas from Russia, which commands 28 percent of world gas reserves, more than any country in the world. Suddenly the Europeans realized there weren’t that many alternative suppliers. Putin’s Kremlin-controlled gas monopoly, Gazprom, has hired German Chancellor Angela Merkel's predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, as a consultant. Gazprom deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev admitted at an economic forum earlier this month that even Britain’s flagship utility, Centrica, should be considered a potential takeover target. "With our present financial strength, it is very difficult to find a company which is not on our watch list," he said.
What does all this geostrategic strutting have to do with soaring prices at the gas pump? For one thing, the uncertainty created by Iran, Iraq and Venezuela has added a $10-$20 risk premium to the price of oil per barrel, according to Wall Street analysts. The politics of energy also doesn't bode well for future prices, as U.S. Secretary of Energy Sam Bodman seemed to suggest last weekend when he said Americans might have to get used to paying $3-plus per gallon for gasoline.
Today, oil and gas experts around the world are growing alarmed not just at future scarcity—the idea that the world may have hit “peak oil” seems to be taking hold—but at who's in control of the precious stuff. As demand for energy explodes worldwide, there is less of it available and less exploration for it. That is partly because of a dropoff in investment created by the decline in oil prices in the '90s. But it is also because multinational corporations like ExxonMobil (despite its record profits) now own just 6 percent of supplies, versus a whopping 77 percent that's now owned by state-owned entities, according to the Petroleum Finance Corp., a Washington-based consulting group. State control guarantees less efficiency in the exploration for oil, and in the extraction and refinement of fuel. Further, these state-owned companies do not divulge how much they really own, or what the production and exploration numbers are. These have become the new state secrets.
Quietly an understanding of this power shift in the world is growing in Washington, as well. The price shock after Hurricane Katrina, especially—not to mention the plummeting poll numbers that followed for Bush—led administration officials to understand just how fragile U.S. economic security has become because of energy. Nothing quite like it has happened since the 1973 OPEC embargo. Administration sources say the Katrina effect, as well as concern over moves by Chavez, were mainly behind Bush's surprising call for an end to "America's oil addiction" in his State of the Union address last January. At the same time, U.S. officials have come to realize that there is deep anger and enmity in the Kremlin against the United States (particularly over U.S. efforts to win Ukraine and Georgia to the West), and that Putin has his own agenda. One example: even as Moscow has joined the Western effort to confront Tehran over its nuclear program, Russia and Iran are taking a unified stand in resisting a U.S. effort to build a trans-Caspian pipeline that would reroute gas out of the Russian system to Baku, Azerbaijan.
Putin has long been nursing ambitions of using Russia's vast oil and gas supplies as an instrument of power. In the mid '90s, after 15 years in the KGB, Putin went back to school, attending the St. Petersburg Mining Institute. He wrote a dissertation titled "Toward a Russian Transnational Energy Company." The topic: how to use energy resources for grand strategic planning. There is reason to believe that Putin's highly publicized confrontation with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former owner of the defunct Yukos—the last of the big private energy concerns in Russia—was about much more than wresting political power from the so-called oligarchs, former apparatchiks who gained control of Russia’s resources after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Putin is not known to be personally corrupt, or even particularly power-hungry. What he is hungry for—and indeed has been since he was elected in 2000—is a restoration of Russia's power and influence. Some observers believe that Putin's trumped-up arrest of Khodorkovsky—who will be spending the next few years in a Siberian labor camp—was mainly about taking control of the energy sector, rather than edging aside a political rival.
It is tempting to say that oil and gas have become the new strategic weapons of the 21st century. But in one crucial respect that is not true. As Putin discovered from his aborted effort to cut off Ukraine’s gas—and as even Ahmadinejad is learning—when you threaten to cut off your customers, you only cut off your own nose. You have to sell oil to someone; otherwise crude is just black muck. Where the control of energy counts is in accumulating wealth, and therefore power and influence. As former U.S. under secretary of State Marc Grossman says, "The question is what are they doing with the money."
The Bush administration may think it has one trump card in Iraq. U.S. interests obviously lie with the vast proven and potential Iraqi oil fields, said to be the world's largest. The Iraqi oil ministry has signed about 40 memorandums of understanding, many with U.S. companies, according to industry sources. Under them, the majors such as ExxonMobil, Chevron and ConocoPhillips are giving technical advice "free" to the ministry (a typical get-in-the-door strategy for the industry). Challenged at a congressional hearing in March, CENTCOM commander Gen. John Abizaid was frank in suggesting that, while oil was not the reason America went to war, it may provide a critical reason for staying. "The United States and its allies have a vital interest in the oil-rich region," Abizaid said. "Ultimately it comes down to the free flow of goods and resources on which the prosperity of our own nation and everybody else in the world depend."
But after three years of explosive anger against the U.S. occupation, it would be foolish to think that the Iraqi government, too, won’t catch the nationalist bug that’s spreading worldwide, in what appears to be an outgrowth of both antiglobalization sentiments and anti-Americanism. “I think the likelihood is high that American companies will have some significant position in Iraq,” says J. Robinson West, head of Petroleum Finance Corp. “On the other hand I think it’s highly unlikely that the petroleum sector will be dominated by American companies. We really didn't go to war over oil, and I think at this late date we don't want to make it look like we did.” ExxonMobil spokesman Russ Roberts adds, "The Iraqi oil belongs to the Iraqi people. If the Iraqi people determine that they want the help of international oil companies in developing their resources, then ExxonMobil would certainly be interested in participating."
What does it all mean? "Welcome to the age of energy insecurity," says West, a former Reagan administration official (and friend of Dick Cheney's, the man who once dismissed energy conservation as a "personal virtue"). "Worldwide production will peak. The result will be skyrocketing prices, with a huge, sustained economic shock. Jobs will be lost. Without action, the crisis will certainly bring energy rivalries, if not energy wars. Vast wealth will be shifted, probably away from the U.S. For the last 20 years, U.S. policy has discouraged production and encouraged consumption. If we dither any more, we will pay a terrible price, the economic equivalent of a Category 5 hurricane. Katrina was Category 4."
Washington appears as helpless in preparing for this crisis as it did in anticipating Hurricane Katrina. As we have seen in recent weeks, Congress is still dithering over such silly proposals as a $100 rebate to gasoline customers. But Republican leaders are balking at sponsoring proposals that could really make a difference, like a new gasoline tax that would change U.S. consumption habits and a serious increase in CAFE (corporate average fuel-economy) standards, which require automakers to meet an average mileage requirement. With the GOP facing a bitter fight for control of the Congress later this year, such measures are considered too politically painful. There could be a lot more pain for Americans down the road, however, at the hands of Putin and his energy-rich allies.
© 2006 Newsweek, Inc.
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